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ABSTRACT 
 
AN EVALUATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION  
IN INDONESIA 
By 
Deny Junanto 
 
 
Decentralization in Indonesia has experienced the up and down since its independence. 
Central and local government relationship has changed several times. At the 
beginning, central government held a great power over regions. In particular, after 
being colonialized for long time, the new Indonesian government exercised strong 
centralization in order to keep unity and freedom of the country. However, the 
attention of decentralization became discourses at that time. The central government 
supported regional autonomy by passing the first law of decentralization. 
Unfortunately it was never implemented appropriately. 
 
 Before the Law 22/1999 was enacted, the decentralization is never really put 
into practice. The reluctant of central government to devolve the authority to local 
government was a major problem. Following the economic crisis and local unrests, 
central government finally implemented the decentralization that started from year 
2001. 
 
 Nevertheless some years into decentralization, the outcome was not as 
expected. Problems such as conflict of interest between central and local governments, 
 iv
inadequate capacity of local governments to perform their new functions, unclear law 
and deregulation, lack of accountability hampered the intention of decentralization.  
 
 Indonesian government passed the Law 32/2004 to improve the 
decentralization. The major distinction between the new law and before is about 
strengthening role of provincial government and direct election of heads of local 
government. However, except the direct election of heads of local executive, the 
impacts of the new law were still insignificant for decentralization in general.  
 
 In order to develop decentralization process, the thesis evaluates the 
decentralization policy from the aspects administrative empowerment, fiscal 
empowerment, and the monitoring system on local government by central government. 
Afterward, necessary recommendations are given. Some of them are: the vision when 
interpreting decentralization policy and autonomy concept has to equal in all 
government levels; the entire of government layers have to demonstrate their strong 
commitment to support decentralization policy for the sake of people as their 
stakeholder; central government agencies must provide supporting regulations to 
facilitate the amendment of local legislation, which is believed inconsistent with the 
decentralization law. 
 v
  
 
 
 
 
 
Dedicated to Ibu, Bapak, Trixie and Diva 
 vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
 
First of all, my gratitude to the Almighty God Allah SWT, without His guidance it 
was impossible for me to finish this paper. As well, I want to thank my beloved Mom 
and Dad, my lovely wife Trixie and daughter Diva who always giving me generous 
support and prayer all the time.  
 
Furthermore, I am exceptionally grateful to the Dean Professor Chin-Seung CHUNG, 
all respected professors and staff of KDI School of Public Policy and Management 
who have given me very useful knowledge and very kind assistance – in particular 
Professor Jin PARK for his precious time and valuable advices on this paper.  
 
Finally, I also would like to thank the chairman and all staff of National Institute of 
Public Administration of the Republic of Indonesia who permitted and supported me 
to take a master program in Korea. I know my paper is still far from perfect, but I 
hope it could give a little contribution to the public administration development in 
Indonesia. 
 
 
 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION …………………………………………………………….. 1 
A. Background  .......…………………………………………………………… 1 
B. Research Questions ………………………………………………………… 4 
C. Objective ………………………………………………………………….... 4 
D. Thesis Structure ……………………………………………………………. 4 
 
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK …………………………………………….. 6 
A. What is Decentralization? …………………………………………………. 7 
B. Development in Decentralization ………………………………………….. 9 
C. Geographical or Accessibility Decentralization ……………………………. 11 
D. Political Decentralization …………………………………………………... 13 
E. Management Decentralization ……………………………………………… 16 
F. Success Factor of Decentralization …………………………………………. 20 
G. Conceptual Definition ……………………………………………………… 23 
 
III. METHODOLOGY ……………………………………………………………. 24 
A. Research Method …………………………………………………………… 24 
B. Data Collecting Technique …………………………………………………. 25 
C. Data Analysis …...………………………………………………………….. 25 
 
IV. DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA ……………………………………. 26 
A. Decentralization History in Indonesia ………………………………………26 
B. Current Decentralization …………………………………………………… 30 
1. The Forming of New Regions……………………………………………38 
2. Direct Election of Heads Local Governments.…………………….......... 40 
C. Government Structure after Decentralization ……………………………… 41 
  
V. EVALUATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION…...... 50 
A. Administrative Empowerment…………….………………………………... 50 
 viii
1. Local Government’s Duties in Providing Public Services ……………... 54 
2. Transfer of Personnel from Central to Local Government……………… 71 
B. Fiscal Empowerment ……………………………………………………….. 74 
C. Monitoring System on the Local Government by the Central Government... 91 
 
V. POLICY RECOMMENDATION……………………………………………... 96 
A. Administrative Empowerment……………………………………………… 96 
B. Fiscal Empowerment ……………………………………………………….. 98 
C. Monitoring System on the Local Government by the Central Government... 99 
 
 ix
LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
1. Structure of Government Work Units in the Regions under Law No.5/1974 43 
2. Structure of Government Work Units in the Regions under Law No.22/1999 44 
3. Public Sector Employment in Indonesia      71 
4. Structure of Local Government Revenues before Decentralization  76 
5. Transferred Funds to Kabupaten/Kota Level     77 
6. DAU Dominates         78 
7. DAU Block Grant and Transferred Funds before Decentralization  80 
8. Revenue Sharing         84 
9. Regional Taxes         86 
 x
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 
1.  Indonesian Archipelago  27 
2.  The Milestones of Relationship between Center-Region 29 
3.  Framework of Government before Law 22/1999 33 
4.  Framework of Government after Law 22/1999 34 
5.  Framework of Government based on Law 32/2004 38 
6.  Division of Authority in Implementing Government Services Between  
 Central and Regional Governments Based on Management Principle  
 Functions 51 
7. Monitoring on Local Governments 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi
I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
 
A. Background 
 
Decentralization in Indonesia that started in the year 2001 has not been through with a 
long process. Throughout the history, after 32 years experiencing highly centralized, 
Indonesian government shifted into decentralize system. This was a strong reaction of 
centralized system that did not satisfy most of the regions and local people. Some 
analysts called this phenomenon as a ‘big-bang’. Actually the law of decentralization 
has been enacted several times but the implementation itself still far from ideal.  
 
Apparently decentralization is a better alternative yet still imperfect, related to 
the Indonesia’s demography. It consists of 17,000 islands with more than 230 million 
people. Realizing the situation and people’s demand, in 1999 government enacted the 
Law No. 22/1999 about Local Government and Law No. 25/1999 about Fiscal 
Balance between the Central Government and the Regions. These two laws are the 
fundamental law for decentralization implementation, even there were several laws 
concerning decentralization since Indonesian independence  
 
However, from the 2001 when it started to prevail, the acceleration of 
decentralization is still facing many problems. The outcome is still far from the 
expectation. The local governments’ capacity in managing their own people and 
territory was not good enough. The preparation was ridden with problems, had to 
meet tight deadlines, and was far from completed by the time regional autonomy took 
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effect. Within one year, the decentralization much of the responsibility for public 
services to the local level, almost doubled the regional share in government spending, 
reassigned 2/3 of the central civil service to the regions, and handed over more than 
16,000 service facilities to the regions. Indonesia also implemented a new 
intergovernmental fiscal framework, which relied largely on a general grant rather 
than the earmarked grants of the past, and gave natural resource producing regions a 
share of the resource revenues.  
 
Several years into decentralization, the assignment of functions over levels of 
government is far from clear. The lack of clarity is in part due to weaknesses in the 
decentralization laws themselves. Conflicts in implementing regulations and sectoral 
laws that is out of line with Law 22/1999 play their part as well. Even some of the 
implementing regulations for Law 22/1999 itself seem to contradict the Law. 
Furthermore, a Presidential Decree gave some agencies temporary exemption from 
decentralization, for instance those for land and investment approval, thus further 
blurring the division of responsibility over levels of government. 
 
Meanwhile, based on Law No.22/1999 decentralization over budgetary issues 
is mainly to apply to the expenditure side not on the fiscal or revenue side. As the 
result, even though the regions now have the authority to decide how to allocate their 
budget, they do not have revenue-raising powers. The regions are still heavily 
dependent on transfers from the central government. Regardless of this lack of fiscal 
autonomy, there is a lot enthusiasm for decentralization in the regions and this 
enthusiasm appears to be rising. Enthusiasm as such on the part of local government 
has generally resulted in the creation of many more regulations regarding local taxes 
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and levies, excluding income and assets. This trend has been reinforced by the 
perception that autonomous local governments should have the authority to manage 
and generate revenue. Moreover, many local government officials think that the 
successful implementation of decentralization will eventually depend to a large extent 
upon their capability to extract local revenues. The problem is that increases in local 
taxes and levies, excluding income and assets, have not been matched by the 
provision of better services. Regularly the local taxes and levies are being raised 
without any corresponding increase in the provision of services by local governments. 
 
In order to overcome those problems, Indonesian government passed the Law 
No.32/2004 to revise Law No.22/1999 and Law No.34/2004 to improve Law 
No.25/1999 about Local Government and Fiscal Balance respectively. Nevertheless, 
the impact of these two laws is still small on the decentralization improvement in 
general, even though there are some changes emphasize more on political aspects.  
 
Basically the initial intention of decentralization is to closer the government as 
service provider to the people as consumer. Decentralization has close correlation 
with authority. From the year 2001, the central government in Indonesia has 
transferred the authority to local governments for the purpose of better service 
delivery, accountability and administration.  
 
Regarding to those situations occurred, therefore, this thesis would like to 
analyze the implementation of decentralization based on administrative empowerment, 
fiscal empowerment, and the monitoring system on the local government by the 
central government issues.  
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B. Research Questions 
 
Based on the emerging decentralization issues in Indonesia, the thesis would like to 
answer some questions that are: 
1. To what extend the administrative empowerment, fiscal empowerment and the 
monitoring system on the local government by the central government have been 
implementing since the year 2001? 
2. What is the problem occurred and the impact of it? 
3. How to overcome the problems? 
 
C. Objective 
 
The objectives of the thesis: 
1. To evaluate the implementation of decentralization policy in Indonesia since the 
year 2001.  
2. To give recommendation in order to improve decentralization policy.  
3. As one of the prerequisite for achieving Master of Public Policy Degree in KDI 
School of Public Policy and Management. 
 
D. Thesis Structure 
 
The thesis is divided into 6 (six) chapters that can be illustrated in detail as: 
Chapter 1. Introduction. This chapter consists of background, research question, 
objective, and thesis structure. 
Chapter 2.  Theoretical Framework. This chapter explains some fundamental theories 
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about decentralization that are used for analyzing decentralization 
implementation in Indonesia. 
Chapter 3. Methodology. This chapter describes the method and strategy that are 
applied in this thesis.  
Chapter 4. Decentralization in Indonesia. This chapter describes the history of 
decentralization, current decentralization, and government structure after 
decentralization.  
Chapter 5. Evaluation on Implementation of Decentralization. This chapter evaluates 
decentralization with emphasizing on the administrative empowerment, 
fiscal empowerment and monitoring system on the local government by 
the central government in Indonesia. 
Chapter 6. Policy Recommendation. This chapter gives some recommendations about 
decentralization performance in Indonesia.  
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II.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
A major obstacle to the effective performance of public bureaucracies in most 
developing countries such as Indonesia is the excessive concentration of decision-
making and authority within central government. Public sector institutions are 
commonly perceived to be geographically and socially remote from ‘the people’ and 
to take decisions without knowledge or concern about actual problems and 
preferences. The popular remedy for such centralization is decentralization, a term 
which is filled with many positive connotations—proximity, relevance, autonomy, 
participation, accountability and even democracy. So great is the appeal of 
decentralization that it is difficult to locate a government that has not claimed to 
pursue a policy of decentralization in recent years.  
 
 In reality, all national leaders have no choice but to decentralize some 
decision-making and authority. Total centralization (all authority being vested in a 
single individual who takes all decisions) is infeasible even for the most efficient 
autocrat in a micro-state. The needs of the modern state to provide some services to at 
least part of its community, to exercise political control over its territory and to bolster 
its legitimacy require that a degree of authority is delegated and some decisions are 
made outside of the political and administrative center. In consequence, all systems of 
government involve a combination of centralized and decentralized authority. 
However, finding a combination of central control and local autonomy that satisfies 
regime needs and popular demands is a persistent dilemma for governments. 
Centralization and decentralization are not attributes that can be dichotomized, rather 
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they represent hypothetical poles on a scale that can be calibrated by many different 
indices. 
 
A. What is decentralization? 
 
Most authors are agreed that decentralization within the state involves a transfer of 
authority to perform some service to the public from an individual or an agency in 
central government to some other individual or agency which is ‘closer’ to the public 
to be served. The basis for such transfer is most often territorial, that is grounded in 
the desire to place authority at a lower level in a territorial hierarchy and thus 
geographically closer to service providers and clients. However, transfer can also be 
made functionally, that is by transferring authority to an agency that is functionally 
specialized. Such transfers of authority are of three main types. The first is when the 
delegation is within formal political structures; the second is transfer within public 
administrative or parastatal1 structures; and the third is when the transfer is from an 
institution of the state to a non-state agency. 
 
 If the transfer of authority from central government to a decentralized agency 
is to be effective then it must be matched by a transfer of responsibility; that is, the 
decentralized agency must provide the particular function(s) for which it now has 
authority. This will require the creation of additional or new modes of accountability 
by which the decentralized agency accounts for its performance to a higher authority. 
When authority is delegated by devolution, a typical accountability mechanism is 
local elections in which the local population is ultimately the ‘higher authority’. With 
                                                          
1 Owned or controlled wholly or partly by the government. 
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deconcentration the additional accountability mechanisms are usually within the 
bureaucracy, although ultimately a minister or national leader may be seen as being 
accountable to national political institutions for the deconcentrated actions and 
performance. When authority is transferred to parastatals and quangos 2 , 
accountability mechanisms, although often specified in legal documents, become 
somewhat diffuse. 
 
 It must be noted that decentralization does not imply that all authority should 
be delegated. The central government must retain a core of functions over essential 
national matters and ultimately has the authority to redesign the system of government 
and to discipline or suspend decentralized units that are not performing effectively. 
 
 Ideally in such a society all its members should be involved in ensuring the 
public interest. Decentralization of power and local solidarity are principal means to 
counteract the threats to freedom that any gap between rulers and ruled implies. The 
shreds of full citizen participation in government in industrialized countries are now 
small historical curiosities. Representative systems are widespread, but the extent to 
which they represent the diversity of interests in modern society is generally very 
limited. 
 
 Decentralized organization and management developed as a response to 
changes in society, to government legislation and to changing concepts of 
management. Even though in practice they may be linked in authorities, distinction 
can be drawn between: 
                                                          
2 The UK government’s definition of a Quango is: "A body which has a role in the processes of 
national government, but is not a government department or part of one, and which accordingly 
operates to a greater or lesser extent at arm's length from Ministers." 
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 • Geographical decentralization for better access and more responsive services; 
• Political decentralization for community involvement and strengthened 
representative democracy; 
• Management decentralization for greater organizational effectiveness; 
 
Each organizational change challenges the continuities built into the workings of local 
authorities. 
 
B. Development in Decentralization 
 
Local authorities have recognized the need to develop more responsive services in the 
face of changing public attitudes. There has been recognition of the need to create a 
more flexible organization, and the centralized procedures of the local authority have 
been seen as a source of rigidity. At a time of financial constraint centralized controls, 
far from ensuring the efficient use of resources, have restricted the capacity of 
managers to deploy them effectively in relation to the problems faced. There has been 
a wide-ranging concern in political parties at what are seen as the rigidities of 
bureaucratic working in local authorities. 
 
 The changing framework of ideas brought about gave support to the pressure 
for decentralization. The dangers of centralization are being given greater emphasis in 
thinking about organizations on the role of the center. Handy (1985) has even 
suggested that decentralization may not be enough and that the organization of the 
future may have a federal structure: 
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 Federal organizations … will rely on a small nerve center coordinating a range 
of small, nearly autonomous operations which can be widely dispersed 
geographically. The concept of a holding company which has been a financial 
and legal reality will begin to mean more in strict organizational terms and 
will be as common in the integrated manufacturing company as it is in the 
financial world. 
 
All these different factors have contributed to the interest in decentralization that has 
developed in local government. Decentralization in authorities takes many different 
forms reflecting in part the different problems in the centralized structures at which 
they are directed: 
 
• Concern about the lack of accessibility caused by geographical centralization and 
about the style of working encourage by centralized offices is leading to the 
development of local offices either on a service basis or on an authority-wide basis, 
normally called neighborhood offices; 
• Concern about the lack of control by people over the services provided is leading 
to proposals for extending community control, or for developing the role of the 
councilor as representative of an area; 
• Concern about the constraints upon effective management resulting from 
organization centralization is leading to schemes for devolved management which 
may stress either the need for greater management, effectiveness in deploying 
resources or greater responsiveness to the public. 
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 C. Geographical Decentralization 
 
Local authorities have normally centralized control over their services in the central 
offices. The position has, of course, varied from service to service. Some services are 
necessarily provided locally because they are delivered by fieldworkers, such as 
environmental health officers or agriculture technical assistants. But the fact that a 
service is delivered locally does not necessarily mean that access to the service can be 
achieved locally, or business about the service be conducted locally. Thus, although 
council housing is necessarily a local service, until recently access to the service in 
many authorities could only be secured through the central offices. Indeed under the 
impact of the dominant organizational assumptions, the trend was to reduce direct 
contact with the tenants on estates. 
 
 Meanwhile other pressures were at work within the arena of public housing 
management, mainly the desire to minimize the cost and staff commitment of an 
exploding service. Other services such as education, health, public works services are 
necessarily provided in local premises to which access is normally possible—at least 
for those who have found their way in the local authority system. 
 
 Social services had recognized the need for area organization at the time of the 
formation of the new departments. Area organizational structures reflected the 
requirement of each separate service organization and not the needs of the people 
served. 
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 However, a new approach was adapted to area organization which focused on 
the people served through the development of neighborhood offices. The issue of 
access was seen as important, but more was involved than access. The intention was 
to create ‘a new style of working’ focusing on the needs of the public. It was often 
associated in rhetoric, if not always in reality, with an emphasis on community control. 
The change to local offices was likely to lead to management decentralization, but the 
emphasis was on ‘going local’ to ensure greater access by, greater responsiveness to, 
and even greater control by, local people, and in some instances the management 
implications were not fully worked out. 
 
 There were organizational changes through the creation of the position of the 
neighborhood officer who was responsible for the overall management of the office. 
The intention was to create a style of working in the neighborhood offices that 
challenged traditional departmental working. 
  
 Neighborhood offices on a cross-service basis which have also developed in 
other authorities have been effective in improving access and in encouraging a style of 
working that is responsive to the public within the limits of the discretion available to 
staff. Whether the creation of neighborhood offices involves more fundamental 
change is less certain. There was an aspiration amongst the advocates of 
decentralization that challenged traditional departmentalism. In practice, 
neighborhood offices have often been added on to structures that remain based on 
departments. 
 
 Neighborhood offices in the widest sense of the term have not developed to 
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anything like the extent to which its advocates hoped. A number of local authorities 
which attempted to develop neighborhood offices had to abandon the attempt. The 
reasons why local authorities have not pursued their aim varies. Cost is clearly a 
factor. In some authorities trade-union attitudes were seen as creating problems. 
 
 It may well be that there is a more fundamental reason. Where the wider local 
authority organizational and political structures remain departmental, neighborhood 
offices that aspire to a new style of working are in effect operating against the basic 
assumption of the structure.  
 
 In practice it has been much easier to create local offices on a departmental 
basis. There have always been such offices but recent years have seen a marked 
extension in housing, where it has also been associated with the growth of the 
generalist housing officer.  
 
 Although movement to geographical decentralization has proceeded furthest in 
particular departments, to an extent the point remains the same as for wider 
decentralization. By itself it has limited value. Access is improved, but geographical 
decentralization changes little else, unless the department or the authority is prepared 
to change its way of working at the center of the authority—and that must involve 
political change as well as change in officer structures. 
 
D. Political Decentralization 
 
The changes discussed so far have been concerned with geographical decentralization 
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of the officer structure. They have been mainly concerned to improve access for the 
public as customer, although they have also been concerned to alter the style of 
working. Those approaches can be regarded as largely representing what Hoggett and 
Hambleton have described as consumerist approaches. One theme that runs through 
such approaches is ‘the desire to focus more attention on the quality as distinct from 
the quantity of service’ (Hoggett and Hambleton, 1987). 
 
 There have also been (sometimes associated with these changes) movements 
towards political decentralization or devolution. These belong to what Hoggett and 
Hambleton describe as collectivist solutions, which embrace wider objectives 
‘relating to strengthening local democracy (as a contribution to sustaining democracy 
as a whole) and diffusing power and responsibility within society’. 
 
 A broad distinction can be drawn between decentralization based on the 
representative structure of the council and decentralization directly involving the 
public although in practice development of the former approach can lead on to the 
latter. 
 
 In the traditional local authority, the role of the councilor in the working of the 
authority is focused on the service or central committee structure or in any other part 
of the organization to the role of the councilor as representative for an area. Of course, 
the councilor raises issues on behalf of his or her constituents and they are dealt with 
in the officer structure. Councilors hold advice bureaux in their wards or electoral 
districts and are generally concerned with their areas. However such activities and 
concerns lie outside the working of the council, as represented by its formal structure 
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and processes. Concern for the area runs counter to the traditional ways of working. A 
councilor who is elected to represent an area is turned by the working of the authority 
towards a concern for the running of services—from being a representative of the 
public into an advocate for the service. Councilors whose main concern is for their 
area are often spoken of as ‘parochial’ or as mere ‘political welfare workers’. 
 
 Strengthening the accountability of the authority to the public and the 
responsiveness of the organization to the political process can build on the role of the 
councilor as an elected representative through the development of new settings within 
the working of the authority. There is a distinction between local authorities which 
have created settings to give expression to the representative role of the councilor 
within a structure still organized on traditional lines and the exceptional authority that 
has changed that structure. 
 
 Based on research conducted by Stoker and Lowndes (1991), each 
neighborhood has developed a particular character and way of working, a reflection of 
the political priorities of its councilors and the managerial quality of the senior staff 
that were appointed to operate in each neighborhood. 
 
 Their conclusion that it was successful as a platform its customer oriented 
policies. It ensured that officers serving the public were accessible, knowledgeable 
and keen to provide service. They identified problems, however, in handling strategic 
issues and in providing specialist cover. Decentralization does not necessarily remove 
the role for the center. 
 
 15
 While decentralization brought advances, the need for a center remained. 
Some of the local authorities that have adopted the first or more limited approach 
have created new institutions for community involvement. Authorities which have 
introduced neighborhood offices have also developed new forms of community 
involvement as have other authorities.  
 
 Such developments are more about opening the local authority to greater 
public influence rather than the transfer of substantive powers to direct public control. 
They, therefore, only go a limited way in achieving the aims set out by Hoggett and 
Hambleton. They can strengthen local democracy but do not go far in diffusing 
powers. Where a transfer of power has developed it has normally been in the control 
of specific facilities on estates as in user control of leisure centers or tenant control of 
estate management, usually within policies and procedures laid down by the authority. 
 
 Nevertheless all these developments challenge traditional ways of working 
and the organization assumptions on which they depend. 
 
E. Management Decentralization 
 
The traditional working of local authorities has been organizationally centralized as a 
result of detailed control by service committees and departmental hierarchies as well 
as central committees and departments. Detailed control is not necessarily effective 
control. Because the focus is on direct control as it happens, the emphasis is upon 
particular decisions. There is no need to specify what is required in advance because 
decisions are taken as they arise but that can mean a failure to specify requirements to 
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be met by management. Detailed control and centralization, whether exercised over 
departments can weaken management effectiveness. A manager who has to seek 
approval for detailed decisions, on staffing changes or virement3  between budget 
heads, becomes a resource bidder rather than resource manager, deploying resources 
in the most effective way to meet the authority’s requirements. It weakens 
management responsibility and limit management initiative. Detailed control reduces 
the capacity of the authority to respond to the public in ways that better their 
requirements within the purposes of the authority. 
 
 Detailed control is challenged by the development of compulsory competitive 
tendering and of contract management, where what is required is specified in advance. 
It is also challenge by the legislation on local management in schools which reflects in 
theory if not always in practice a concept of control.  
  
 Coopers and Lybrand (1981) argued that the underlying philosophy of 
financial delegation to schools stems from the application of the principles of good 
management. Good management requires the identification of management units for 
which objectives can be set and resources allocated; the unit is then required to 
manage itself within those resources in a way which seeks to achieve the objectives; 
the performance of the unit is monitored and the unit is held to account for its 
performance and the use of funds. 
 
 But it was not merely government legislation that challenged the assumption 
of direct control. The interest in a new rhythm of control based on specifying 
                                                          
3 The authorized transference of funds from one account to another. 
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requirements, giving management responsibility and enforcing accountability derived 
from a wider search for both effective and responsive management. 
 
 The Audit Commission (1988) in the Great Britain had argued strongly for 
decentralized financial management. If councils are to make the maximum use of 
their management potential and financial resources, it is essential to involve line 
managers more closely in the financial control process. This requires a number of 
developments: 
 
• Every part of a department’s budget should be assigned to a designated 
‘budget-holder’—typically a front-line manager such as a head teacher or 
the manager of a recreation center who should take the lead in preparing 
his or her own budget; 
• Each budget-holder needs to receive clear and prompts reports showing 
what they have spent to date, and compare this with the budget. Financial 
systems should be aligned with management responsibilities. 
• Managers should then accept a greater degree of responsibility for their 
own financial control. 
 
The Audit Commission also argued not merely for decentralized financial 
management, but generally the only way properly to harness politics and management 
is for members to assign very clear responsibilities to officers, to set a framework of 
accountability and then let them get on with it. 
 
 Decentralized management is not easily introduced. It requires the 
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identification of cost centers to which both management and financial responsibilities 
have to be related. Financial data and accounting procedures have to be related to the 
cost centers, which is likely to require new financial information systems. But it is not 
sufficient to allocate budgets to cost centers and hold managers to account for those 
budgets. The management targets have to be specified for performance as well as the 
policy constraints within which the managers have to operate. Procedures have to be 
introduced both for setting targets, assessing performance and holding managers to 
account. 
 
 These obstacles can all be overcome. The financial information can be 
produced and procedures introduced, although they will need time and care. It has to 
be realized, however, that introducing decentralized resource management involves 
more than technical and procedural change. Changes in attitude are required because 
of the change in ways of working. 
 
 Without such changes in attitude, managers used to seeking permission for 
virement may be reluctant to take responsibility for their own decisions. They may not 
be ready to think positively and innovatively about the redeployment of resources 
having been trained by experience to regard such redeployment as the exception 
requiring special permission, rather than as a normal part of the management task. In 
particular they may feel ill-equipped for financial management, and may thus be 
reluctant to exercise their new responsibilities. 
 
 It is not simply the head of the cost centers who have to change, the role of 
central departments also have to change—as have the senior management of the 
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service departments. Their role does not disappear—far from it. The cost centers have 
to operate within a policy and financial framework with which both central 
departments and the senior management in departments must be involved. As with 
other aspects of decentralization, it does not involve the abolition of the role of the 
center but its redefinition. Redefining the role of the center and the development of 
decentralized resource management has to be considered together. 
 
 The center—whether those in the central departments or in the department 
themselves have to learn to stand further back, but not to stand back completely. It has 
to make its expertise available and yet not impose it—for it has to learn to help when 
it knows it would come more easily to act directly. 
 
 Decentralized management covers not only financial but also human resources, 
reorganization, relations among authorities and other efforts that improve good 
management. The central government plays significant role to give clear direction and 
regulation to local governments. All of these aspects are closely related to each other. 
 
F. Success Factor of Decentralization  
 
Leach, Steward and Walsh (1994) argued that the different forms of decentralization 
vary in the extent to which they have been adopted: 
 
• Management decentralization within departments has been more readily achieved 
than management decentralization across departments; 
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• Decentralization of access has been more readily achieved than decentralization of 
decision-making; 
• Decentralization of decision-making within the officer structure is more 
widespread than devolution of power to area committees or to local communities. 
 
Therefore the greater the challenge to existing ways of working, the more difficult 
they are to achieve. 
 
 The working of local authorities has been based on a professional tradition. 
That is challenged by neighborhood organization on a cross-departmental basis. It is 
even more deeply challenge by the devolution of power to the community or even to 
area committees. 
 
 The organizational assumptions on which the traditional-workings of local 
authorities have been based are directly challenged by aspects of decentralization. 
Decentralization of decision-making permits a diversity of response rather than 
uniformity of practice. Hierarchical control is lessened, while organization by area 
challenges functional organization. The political structure of local authorities is based 
on representative democracy, which can be seen as limiting the devolution of power to 
communities. Even the devolution of power to area committees may be seen as 
undermining majority control if it means (as it will in most authorities) giving power 
to at least some area committees controlled by the opposition. 
 
 Given the considerations, the devolution of management responsibility is the 
most widely accepted aspect of decentralization, since this can maintain departmental 
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control, does not necessarily challenge professionalism, and ensures the required 
degree of uniformity through the targets set and policy constraints on managers. 
Equally it is not surprising that the devolution of substantial political power to 
communities or even to area committees is the least accepted aspect of 
decentralization because of the extent of the challenge to existing practice. 
 
 Certainly decentralization has probably generally only led to modification of, 
rather than fundamental change in, existing ways of working. Where successful 
management decentralization has released management initiative, decentralization to 
local offices has led to improved access for the public, some improvement in working 
between neighboring staff drawn from different departments, and examples of more 
responsive service. None of these are unimportant gains, but they have not led to the 
fundamental alterations of political and management power that some advocates of 
radical decentralization sought. Professional power remains; the local authority is still 
a bureaucratic organization; political power remains with the council leadership. 
 
 The reason for the failure may well be that the advocates of radical 
decentralization failed to recognize that there are strengths as well as weaknesses in 
those principles they wished to challenge. 
 
 Professionalism brings real knowledge, real skills and real commitment, even 
though it can also bring rigidity, narrowness and an over-dependence on political on 
political authority. Bureaucratic organization ensure the large-scale delivery of service 
on a fair and impartial basis, even though it may improperly limit responsiveness; 
representative democracy can provide political leadership giving purposive direction 
 22
in a changing society, even though it can limit individual participation too greatly.  
 
G.  Conceptual Definition 
 
Based on the decentralization theories above, we can develop some concepts that are 
used for analyzing the issues in this thesis. There are three important issues related to 
decentralization which are administrative empowerment, fiscal empowerment, and the 
monitoring system on local government by central government. 
 
The administrative empowerment can be explained as the transfer of duties 
from the central government to the local governments in order to improve access and 
more responsive services. The main duty is providing public services that previously 
provided by central government. Thus it also includes the transferred of civil servants 
from central government for the purpose of enhancing local government capacity. 
 
Meanwhile the fiscal empowerment can be explained as the transfer of money 
from central government to local governments. Fiscal empowerment will enable local 
governments to take the right steps for over all growth with equity. The empowerment 
brings government truly closer to the people. It is also aligned with increasing demand 
of accountability. 
 
Eventually the monitoring system on local government by central government 
means that central government admonishes, cautions, or reminds, especially with 
respect to matters of conduct to the local governments based on the decentralization 
law and regulations.  
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III.   METHODOLOGY 
 
 
A. Research Method 
 
The thesis employs evaluation research based on secondary data analysis. Evaluation 
is the systematic acquisition and assessment of information to provide useful feedback 
about some object. The generic goal of most evaluations is to provide “useful 
feedback” to a variety of audience, in example sponsors, donors, client-groups, 
administrators, staff and other relevant constituencies. 
 
 There are many different types of evaluations depending on the object being 
evaluated and the purpose of the evaluation. The most important basic distinction in 
evaluation types is that between formative and summative evaluation. Formative 
evaluations strengthen or improve the object being evaluated—they help form it by 
examining the delivery program or technology, the quality of its implementation, and 
the assessment of the organizational context, personnel, procedures, inputs and so on. 
Summative evaluations, in contrast, examine the effects or outcomes of some 
object—they summarize it by describing what happens subsequent to delivery of the 
program or technology, assessing whether the object can be said to have caused the 
outcome, determining the overall impact of the causal factor beyond only the 
immediate target outcomes, and estimating the relative costs associated with the 
object.4
 
                                                          
4 Trochim, William M. The Research Methods Knowledge Base, 2nd Edition. Internet WWW page, at 
URL: <http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/index.htm> 
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 Thus formative evaluation is chosen because the objective of the thesis is to 
evaluate the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia based on theoretical 
background and to investigate the problems and impacts. Thus it can give alternative 
solution for the problems. 
  
B. Data Collecting Technique 
 
Data and information are collected from secondary researches. Literature review is 
taken for the reason that the scope of research object is broad and extensive. 
Moreover evaluation research requires literature review. Therefore this thesis 
thoroughly exercises other researches and materials such as books, articles, and 
newspapers that describe the facts and status of decentralization in Indonesia as 
evaluation substances. 
 
C. Data Analysis 
 
The thesis applies qualitative approach to analyze the data and information. It needs 
because we want to explore facts and evaluate empirical implementation of 
decentralization in Indonesia. Data and information is classified and evaluated based 
on theoretical framework, namely administrative empowerment, fiscal empowerment, 
and the monitoring system on local government by central government to acquire a 
comprehensive analysis.   
 26
IV.   DECENTRALIZATION IN INDONESIA 
 
 
Within this chapter, we will see and analyze how decentralization policy has been 
implementing in Indonesia. Actually the policy debate and resulting directives 
surrounding center-region relations are not recent phenomena. Decentralization policy 
in that been implemented in 2001 was not the first decentralization attempt. It started 
when the Dutch colonial power issued its decentralisatiewet as a means of making its 
administration more efficient in ruling the population and extracting resources. This 
initiative was a response to the complex challenges facing the colonial establishment. 
However, the colonial power maintained strong central control and a rigid hierarchical 
system of government. When Japan occupied the archipelago from 1942 to 1945, 
wartime demands put a premium on centralization of powers in the hands of the 
Japanese forces. 
 
A. Decentralization History in Indonesia 
 
After independence in 1945, the new republican government understood the 
importance of center-region relations and quickly issued laws on center-region powers 
that established more discretion on the part of the regions. Indonesia’s first law that 
arranges regional autonomy was Law 1/1945. Regional autonomy and the rights of 
the regions were also specified in article 18 of the 1945 constitution. This established 
the Republic of Indonesia as a unitary state.  
 
 Nevertheless, the Dutch reluctant to give up their colonial empire and started 
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establishing several Indonesian republics on the islands outside Java, and all united 
under the Dutch crown. This was largely a political move against the Republic of 
Indonesia, aimed to support the argument that Republic of Indonesia was only one 
part of Indonesia that was seeking independence from the Dutch. This move resulted 
in the handing over of sovereignty to the United Republics of Indonesia—a federal 
state within a commonwealth with the Netherlands. It only lasted less than one year 
and the 1950 constitution reverted to a unitary state.  
 
Figure 1. Indonesian Archipelago 
  Source: www.id.eueom.org/ info_map_id.html 
  
 The period of liberal democracy in the early and mid-1950s provided for a 
wide degree of power to the regions, culminating in 1957 legislation. Law No.1/1957 
attempted to revitalize regional autonomy, but after the outbreak of regional unrests 
on Sumatera, Sulawesi, and in West Java, these attempts were ended. Presidential 
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Decision No.6/1959 reinstated the 1945 constitution, and effectively abolished the 
1957 autonomy law.  The policy toward centralization began when Indonesia entered 
into a more authoritarian period with then President Soekarno’s Guided Democracy in 
1959. The Law No.18/1965 eradicated some aspects of decentralization.  
 
 The centralization became pervasive with the Orde Baru (New Order) regime 
beginning in 1967. Nonetheless, Soeharto’s government enacted Law No.5/1974 that 
conveyed the issue of regional autonomy. This law, whose implementing regulations 
started to dribble in only in 1992, was never fully implemented. In almost all aspects 
of politics and government such as democracy, fiscal balance, and public 
administration, the Soeharto regime instituted a rigid hierarchical power structure 
with central government exercising strong control over every level in the political, 
governmental, and societal hierarchy. The regime managed this effort through the 
military and the bureaucracy. During this period, the central government in Jakarta 
monopolized economic management and natural resources extraction in the regions. 
The authoritarian power structure created a deep-rooted social discontent, particularly 
in the regions. 
 
 The Law No.5/1974 assigned fewer functions to the regions than the current 
decentralization law, but the key difference lay in the process of decentralization. The 
regions had to prove they were ready for implementing their new functions, and the 
center was the judge and the jury of their readiness. An experimental implementation 
of the law in 26 districts finally took off in 1996, but was fraught with difficulties, not 
least because the center did not hand over the personnel and facilities the regions 
needed to perform their new tasks properly. 
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  The experiment with Law 5/1974 was taken over by events. It was only after 
the fall of Soeharto on May 21, 1998 that the regions, with support from democratic 
voices, demanded a new framework in center-regions relations. MPR Decree 
XV/1998 and Laws No.22/1999 and 25/1999 are the pillars of this framework. 
 
Figure 2. The Milestones of Relationship between Center-Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Asia Foundation, 2003 (Modified) 
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Due to the problems emerged in the implementation, after 3 years, 
Yudhoyono’s government revise the Laws No.22/1999 and 25/1999 by new Laws 
No.32/2004 and 33/2004 in order to improve and strengthen decentralization policy 
that has been implementing. The major change is about the political decentralization 
through local elections in the whole regions. 
 
B. Current Decentralization 
 
Law No.22 and 25/1999 went into full effect in January 2001 and provided the 
framework for decentralizing authorities once held by central government and gave 
local governments new responsibilities to manage their own regions. These laws have 
devolved central government powers and responsibilities to local governments in all 
government administrative sectors except for security and defense, foreign policy, 
monetary and fiscal matters, justice and religious affairs.  
 
 This law is quite unusual since almost all powers and responsibilities are 
ceded to local governments without conditions and limitations. As a result, local 
governments have to reform their internal structures to accommodate the huge 
increase in responsibility that has been passed on from the central government. A 
significant part of this process includes placing a large number of central government 
employees under the authority of the regional governments, in order to strengthen 
their capacity to operate effectively and efficiently. The absence of a detailed plan of 
the transition process and the lack of supporting regulations to clarify the procedures 
and processes that need to be undertaken have hampered this sweeping devolution of 
responsibilities. The change in government administration must also deal with a lack 
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of initiative and support from government employees. These same government 
employees who are now carrying out the decentralization process are accustomed to 
being the implementers of highly centralized government policies. 
 
 Principally, the main objectives of decentralization include promoting the 
better delivery of government services and the raising of the level of local government 
accountability. Some of the necessary changes that need to be made for the 
transformation from a centralized autocracy to a decentralized democracy have been 
implemented quite quickly (for example by holding free elections and passing of laws, 
which transfer central   government functions to the regions). Other essential changes 
will take much longer (for example changing the centralized mind-set of public 
servants and building the capacity of regions to cope with their new functions). 
Although decentralization also has the potential to create unrest in the short-term, the 
demands from the regions for greater autonomy are now simply too strong to be 
ignored. In the long term, decentralization has the potential to stabilize political, 
economic and social conditions in Indonesia. 
 
 The new policy of decentralization is outlined in Law No.32/2004 and 
33/2004. These two laws are revising the Law No.22/1999 concerning Local 
Government and Law No.25/1999 concerning The Fiscal Balance between the Central 
Government and the Regions. Both these laws are based on five principles: 1) 
democracy, 2) community participation and empowerment, 3) equity and justice, 4) 
recognition of the potential and the diversity within regions and 5) the need to 
strengthen local legislatures. 
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 The territory of Indonesia is divided into autonomous provinces, districts 
(kabupaten) and municipalities (kota). Districts and municipalities are technically the 
same level of government. This distinction is based on whether the government 
administration is located in a rural area (district) or an urban area (municipality). 
Within districts and municipalities there are sub-districts (kecamatan) which are 
smaller administrative government units. Each sub-district is further divided into 
villages. Villages in rural areas are called desa, while in an urban areas there are 
referred to as kelurahan.  
 
 Decentralization policy transfers functions, personnel and assets from the 
central government to the provincial, as well as the district and the municipal 
governments. This means that additional powers and responsibilities are being 
devolved to district and municipal governments, establishing a far more decentralized 
system compared to the deconcentrated and co-administrated systems of the past. 
Deconcentrated is the delegation of authority by the central government to the 
governor of a province and/or a central government official in the province, 
meanwhile co-administration is when higher levels of government direct lower levels 
to undertake tasks and functions and the higher level of government provides the costs, 
means, infrastructure and human resources to carry out the tasks. The lower level of 
government is obliged to report to the higher level of government regarding the 
execution of these task or function. 
 
 The bupati (district head) and walikota (municipal head) as the head of the 
autonomous local government will be directly responsible to the local assembly 
(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD), while the deconcentrated agencies for 
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devolved functions will be abolished and the civil servants of these agencies will be 
placed under the authority of the regional governments. 
 
Figure 3. Framework of Government before Law 22/1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003 
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provinces have the authority to manage certain matters that cross inter-district and 
inter municipal administration and authorities that are not (or not yet) implemented by 
the districts and municipalities. As the representatives of the central government, the 
provinces carry out certain administration tasks delegated by the President to the 
Governors. The power of districts and municipalities cover all sectors of 
administrative authority other than those of the central government and the provinces, 
including public works, health, education and culture, agriculture, transportation, 
industry and trade, investment, environment, land affairs, cooperatives, and 
manpower. 
 
Figure 4. Framework of Government after Law 22/1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003 
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 However, implementation of Law 22/1999 went too far in some regions. 
Conflict of interests between central and local governments still take in place. The law 
assigns authorities (kewenangan) rather than functions to levels of government. All 
authorities of government except those reserved for the center and the now 33 
provinces are assigned to the 440 local governments. Government Regulation 
No.25/2000 further specifies the authorities of the central of provincial governments. 
The current division of responsibilities is as follows: 
? Central government remains responsible for national defense, international 
relations, justice, security, religion, and monetary and fiscal policies. In these 
functions the center is allowed to maintain its organizations in the regions. The 
central government also has several policy functions for which it can no longer 
maintain an organization in the regions, including national planning, 
intergovernmental fiscal policies, state administration, human resource 
development, natural resource utilization conservation and national 
standardization. 
? The province as an autonomous region has a relatively minor role. It coordinates 
among the local governments, and performs functions that affect more than one 
local government. It also can, at the request of local governments, take on tasks 
that local government cannot yet perform. Law 22 explicitly states that there is no 
hierarchical relationship between the province as an autonomous region and the 
regencies and cities. However, the Governor (not the province) continues to 
perform deconcentrated central tasks, and is the central government representative 
in the regions. As such, he maintains supervisory powers over local governments. 
Implementing regulations further specify the remaining roles of the central and 
provincial governments, including the setting of standards for service delivery. 
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? The local governments perform all functions except those assigned to the center 
and the province. The local governments have obligatory “sectors”, including 
health, education, public works, environment, communications, agriculture, 
industry and trade, capita investment, land, cooperatives, and manpower and 
infrastructure services. While local government can hand back to the province 
functions that they cannot perform, this is not permitted in the case of obligatory 
functions. 
  
 One important issue that unclear is meant by the term ‘authority’ in 
Government Regulation No. 25, 2000 on “The Government Authority and Provincial 
Authority as the Autonomous Government”. Presently this key government regulation 
reads more like a central government instruction about the duties and responsibilities 
of the regions rather than a document that grants authority over new functions. 
According to this regulation, if districts and municipalities lack the capacity to carry 
out certain functions, their responsibilities are to be surrendered to the provincial 
government. Although Government Regulation No. 25, 2000 was intended to clarify 
the process of surrendering functions to the provincial government, many 
uncertainties regarding this process still remain. 
 
 There is also a continuing debate over whether power should be concentrated 
at the provincial level or at the district and municipal level. Many provincial officials 
doubt the capacity of district and municipal governments to implement 
decentralization. They give the impression that they are still hoping that 
decentralization will be implemented at the provincial level and not directly at the 
district and municipal level. Of major concern is that there will not be sufficient funds 
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to finance the more than 700 tasks and functions for which district and municipal 
governments are now responsible. Therefore, many provincial level officials expect 
that within about a year many district and municipal governments will surrender some 
of their responsibilities and functions to the province. 
 
 Since the process of implementation of the new decentralization laws began, 
the position of the province in relation to the district and the municipality has become 
uncertain. The district and municipal governments now have a direct reciprocal 
relationship with the central government. According to Law No.22/1999 each 
autonomous region is independent and there is no longer any hierarchical relationship 
between the province and the district and municipal government. Therefore, in the 
course of carrying out the tasks of government, the district and municipality are 
tending to position themselves as sub-ordinates of the central government, rather than 
the province. Some members of district and municipal elected representative 
assemblies (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah – DPRD) even doubt the authority of 
the provincial assembly in their region.  
 
 Several years after Law 22/1999 had been implemented; central government 
developed it with the new Law No.32/2004. Fundamental distinctions with the 
previous law are the direct election of the head of local government and bring power 
to provincial government as central government representative in regions. The aim of 
this policy is to improve accountability of the local government. However, there is no 
major change in some areas for example in service delivery and authority devolution.   
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Figure 5. Framework of Government based on Law 32/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003 (Modified) 
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regions, resulting from sub-divisions of large geographical areas, has occurred at both 
provincial and local levels. The number of local governments increased from 294 in 
early 2001 to 440 by January 2004, consisting of 349 kabupaten and 91 kota. In 
contrast, there have been almost no mergers (consolidations) at the provincial or local 
level. 
 
 Status change involves the restoration of local social structures and the revival 
of cultural or historical titles for community areas, giving them legitimacy in the 
decentralization law. These changes reverse New Order policy of uniformity of local 
government structure. 
 
 Generally, there were three groups involved in forming new regions decisions: 
local government, elite members of society, and the DPRD. However, in some regions, 
the central government and the DPR were also involved. In some areas, it took two 
years for the DPR and central government to approve establishment of new regions. 
 
 Establishment of new regions did not automatically result in improvements in 
public services or infrastructure. This is because the process was not followed by 
more or better qualified personnel. Also, even when plans were good, there were 
insufficient increases in allocations from the routine governmental budget (APBD). 
 
 In general, public involvement in the new region formation processes is 
intense, in terms of both support and rejection. Citizens both developed initiatives and 
responded to initiatives submitted by local society elites and by local government.  
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 Despite high stakeholder involvement in the process of changing the status of 
a region, local society was generally not aware of Government Regulation 
No.129/2000 on organizing regional expansions. As a result, views differ on future 
regional expansion processes. The local political elites would prefer that regional 
expansion be easier, while local society would prefer stricter requirements for 
expansion. 
 
2.  Direct Election of Heads of Local Government 
 
Under the Law 22/1999 there is a disconnection between the political system and 
regional autonomy. The political system, in the framework of general election and 
political party laws, is perceived as a major issue affecting decentralization.  The roles 
being performed by the executive and the political party are not very clear. Questions 
also arise as to whether political parties are performing their roles as representatives.  
To be truly representative, they should begin to clarify who their constituents are.  
Given the absence of well-understood principles that govern roles and responsibilities, 
some observe that the dynamic between and among the executive, legislative bodies, 
and the political parties is one of collusion to enrich themselves. 
 
 The decision making process is still dominated by elites who protect only their 
personal interests. Budgeting remains an area where unclear rules increase the risk of 
questions about the process.  The accountability of the DPRD as an actor in 
legislating the budget is taken for granted.  The Accountability Report would provide 
the objective basis for assessing performance and for instances where the DPRD ousts 
a bupati or walikota.  If the bupati/walikota and vice bupati/walikota were elected 
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directly, they would be more accountable to the people. 
 
 Hence the central government revised the Law 22/1999 and enacted the Law 
32/2004 that the basic distinction between both decentralization laws is the direct 
election of heads of local government. In some sense direct presidential election 
impacts on local political processes, since the assumption is that if the president is 
directly elected at the national level, then it is logical to provide for direct election of 
the local chief executive as well. Direct election of local chief executives will enhance 
democracy at the local level. 
 
C. Government Structure after Decentralization 
 
One aim of the policy of decentralization and regional autonomy is to bring the 
governments closer to their constituents so that government services can be delivered 
more effectively and efficiently.  
 
 Decentralization is focused at the district and municipality levels. This has 
always been the third tier of government below the central and the provincial levels. 
This is based on the assumption that district and municipal governments have a better 
understanding of the needs and aspirations of their communities than the central 
government. Although this is considerable potential for district and municipal 
governments to be more responsive to community aspirations, before that can occur 
political parties and civil society groups in the regions need to be strengthened to 
ensure that the processes of good government can be properly established. Some 
observers have suggested that decentralization should have been implemented at the 
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provincial level since, it is argued, provinces have greater capacity to handle all these 
expanded responsibilities than the districts and the municipalities. However, it is 
widely accepted that the central government felt that it was politically undesirable to 
build strong, self-governing provinces. The reason behind this is that these may have 
become the forms for stronger regional disintegration, especially in areas like Aceh 
and West Irian where independence movements are already posing a challenge to the 
central government. 
 
 Although in decentralization era, the government services in many regions are 
generally still being carried out by two kinds of government agencies: the 
“autonomous agencies” (instansi otonom) and “vertical agencies” (instansi vertikal). 
The term instansi otonom is applied to all those government offices that were 
previously under the administrative authority of regional government (province, 
district or municipality) and which were funded from the Regional Budget (Anggaran 
Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah, APBD), such as implementation offices (dinas), 
boards, regional secretariats (Sekretariat Daerah, Setda), technical units (Unit 
Pelaksana Teknis, UPT). The term instansi vertikal is applied to those government 
offices that were previously under the administrative authority of the central 
government and which were funded from the central government’s State Budget 
(Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara, APBN), which operated within a 
particular province, district or municipality. These included the provincial offices of 
the central government (Kantor Wilayah—Kanwil), district or municipal offices of the 
central government (Kantor Departemen—Kandep), and technical units of the central 
government.  
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 Before decentralization, the “vertical agencies” were the instruments of the 
central government in the regions carrying out highly centralized government policies. 
Now many of their tasks and powers have been devolved to the regional governments. 
According to Article 12, section (1) of Law No.32/2004, the process of devolving 
these powers must be accompanied by the transfer of funding, infrastructure and 
human resources.  
 
Table 1. Structure of Government Work Units in the Regions under Law No.5/1974 
Geographic Location Central Government Provincial Government 
District and 
Municipal 
Government 
Province Kanwil  
Board (Badan)  
Office (Kantor) 
Technical Unit (UPT) 
Local Secretariat 
Provincial Parliament 
Implementing Unit 
(Dinas)  
Board (Badan)  
Office (Kantor) 
Technical Unit (UPT) 
- 
District and 
Municipality 
Kandep  
Board (Badan)  
Office (Kantor) 
Technical Unit (UPT) 
Branch Office (Cabang 
Dinas) 
Regional Secretariat 
District Parliament 
Implementing Unit 
(Dinas)  
Office of the Bupati 
Assistance  
Board (Badan)  
Office (Kantor) 
Technical Unit (UPT) 
Sub-district 
(Kecamatan) 
Education Supervisor - Branch Office (Cabang 
Dinas)  
Technical Unit (UPT) 
Source: SMERU, 2001 
  
 Therefore, restructuring the institutional framework of local government—the 
organizational hierarchy of government departments—was one of the essential steps 
undertaken to prepare for the implementation of decentralization. In total, 239 
provincial-level offices of the central government (kanwil), 3,933 district-level offices 
of the central government (kandep), and 16,180 technical units (UPT) of the central 
government have been handed over to the provinces, districts, and municipalities. The 
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amalgamation of some offices in the central government hierarchy has resulted in the 
formation of both technical offices and other autonomous agencies. 
 
Table 2. Structure of Government Work Units in the Regions under Law No.22/1999 
Geographic Location Central Government Provincial Government 
District and 
Municipal 
Government 
Province Kanwil  
Board (Badan) (for 
certain administrative 
sectors) 
Local Secretariat 
Parliament Secretariat 
Implementing Unit 
(Dinas)  
Board (Badan)  
Office (Kantor) 
Techinical Unit (UPT) 
- 
District and 
Municipality 
- - Regional Secretariat 
Parliament Secretariat 
Implementing Unit 
(Dinas) 
Board (Badan) 
Office (Kantor) 
Technical Unit (UPT) 
Sub-district 
(Kecamatan) 
- - Branch Office (Cabang 
Dinas) 
Technical Unit (UPT) 
Note: The structure of government has no difference under Law 32/2004 
Source: SMERU, 2001 
  
 In order to become more effective, the regional governments have tried to 
downsize the government structure as efficiently as possible in accordance with the 
principle of “rich in function, poor in structure”. In theory, this requires a significant 
reduction in the present number of public servants. But regional governments have 
always tended to avoid the difficulties caused by retrenching civil servants. As a result, 
many district and municipal governments have had to maintain unnecessarily large 
administrative structures. The provincial governments have also tended to remain 
large, even though their tasks and responsibilities have been substantially reduced. 
 
 Despite efforts by local governments to rationalize the structure of the 
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government, there remain more employees than there are public service positions. 
Besides this structural problem, there is a bias amongst regional government officials 
to fill important positions with putra daerah, meaning literally “sons of the region”. 
This refers to the movement to promote the interests of those who come from a 
particular area or ethnic group over those who are considered to be outsiders. 
Regional government officials admit that putra daerah demands exist. There is an 
expectation that more attention will now be paid to the interests of local people. This 
issue is a reflection of the decreasing level of confidence in the central government, 
which for over three decades treated the regions as an “instrument” to be utilized for 
its own interests. As a result, many people in the regions believe that they have been 
constrained for too long by the central government, and consequently are now 
aspiring to become “the masters of their own region.” 
 
 District and municipal governments have tended to exclude regionally-based 
central government officials when drafting the structure of government bodies. This 
phenomenon is causing anxiety amongst the existing civil service staff in central 
government offices located in the regions. A lack of cooperation and inclusion of staff 
from central government offices by the district and municipal governments raises the 
possibility of poor levels of cooperation once offices have been merged. 
  
 Reorganization also reflects the new authorities of regional governments. The 
new structures are being reviewed and improved. A number of local governments are 
already reviewing and evaluating the performance of their new structures. Many of 
these evaluations reveal that the structures need improvement, and several regions are 
already designing improvements. New administrative units at the kecamatan and 
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kelurahan levels are being created in several regions to provide more access points for 
public service to citizens. Even though structures are simplified, some new offices are 
being created as deemed necessary. This could involve dividing certain local offices 
(i.e. Education and Cultural Office) into two separate offices, or establishing the 
election committee (Rural Representative Board) at the village level.  
 
 Moreover, with the delegation of several authorities from the municipal 
government to the village level, there was expansion of kecamatan at villages, or 
division of kecamatans within town areas. The objective was better administration. 
These newfound authorities have incorporated the use of village nomenclature 
according to original traditions such as the change from “kelurahan” to “kampung” in 
some cases, or the establishment of a local regulation concerning LPM (Society 
Empowering Institution) as a replacement of LKMD (Defense Institution of Village 
Society). These changes are done through legislation. Generally, restructuring and the 
growing consciousness about distinguishing the boundaries and functions of one 
office from another resulted in a “differentiation” in the people’s understanding that 
the local parliament has responsibilities that are different from those of the executive 
branch of the local government. 
 
 Government Regulation 84/2000 provides for local governments to design and 
implement organizational changes that suit their needs and functions. Reorganization 
is linked to efforts to improve the quality of local government performance. Despite 
the difficulties, local governments try to cope with the situation. Setting up an 
integrated working group to review the region’s readiness for implementing 
decentralization indicates local government’s awareness of the need to respond to the 
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demands of decentralization. Similar to the examples already cited, quality 
improvement efforts also include the merger of administrative/licensing units, or the 
establishment of a unit specifically tasked to improve the quality of services. 
Rationalizing the roles of dinas and sub-dinas and setting dinas performance standards 
are other indications of the desire to improve performance. 
 
 One of the major stumbling blocks to local government reorganization is the 
insufficient number of qualified personnel, despite the influx of devolved personnel 
from central government. One result is that some civil servants lose their structural 
positions or do not get appointed to new positions. This is not to say, however, that 
the career system is always entirely based on competency, given the absence of 
standards for evaluating the performance of the organization or its staff. Moreover, 
the incentive system remains unsatisfactory to many. People perceive that the 
reorganization is influenced by local political and business interests. There is less 
priority on improving the personnel cadre than on politicking. The DPRD is deemed 
to lack transparency in its formulation of local regulations, and KKN (corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism) continues to exist. 
 
 Following the devolution of functions and the transfer of large numbers of 
government personnel from the central government, the number of dinas (local 
departments) generally decreased as a result of mergers of units, but the number of 
new badan (agencies) and kantor (offices) increased. The rationale for establishing 
these badan and kantor is to improve the capacity of local government and to 
strengthen coordination among government institutions. Local governments have 
merged offices to restructure the bureaucracy, while creating new ones to ensure that 
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all personnel are assigned to an office. This transition has pushed governments to 
rationalize the structure so that the units reflect decisions on how to carry out new 
local government functions. Some regions have created the badan of Research and 
Development Agency that focuses on providing training and education. Another 
badan, created as a result of restructuring from previous institutions, is the National 
Unity and Community Protection Agency, which is a regional supervisory agency. 
Some former component units were upgraded to badan status, like the Regional 
Financial Agency, formerly under a regional personnel agency. New kantor include 
the Electronic Data Processing Office, the Regional Archive Office, and the 
Information and Communication Office. 
 
 Concern for women’s empowerment is reflected in some restructuring 
initiatives. Some local governments have dedicated sub-agencies or offices for 
women’s empowerment. In regions without a dedicated unit, other structures handle 
women’s concerns, such as the Social Affair Dinas, Social Affairs and Labor Office, 
or Social Affairs Section of the Regional Secretariat. 
 
 Unfortunately in some regions, restructuring has resulted in functional overlap 
or duplication. There are questions about the rationale for creating new offices. There 
is a perception that some of the new offices are created not to improve efficiency, but 
as a strategy to accommodate local officials who should have structural positions but 
lack the relevant skills for these positions. 
 
 In addition there is lack of clear job descriptions and qualifications for new 
positions. This creates a loophole for local favoritism and non-transparency in 
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appointment of officials, and questions are often raised about how positions are filled. 
Because procedures are unclear, appointments are perceived to be political and not 
based on merit and qualifications. 
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V.   EVALUATION ON IMPLEMENTATION OF DECENTRALIZATION 
 
 
Based on the experience of decentralization according to the Law 22/1999 until the 
present (Law 32/2004), we will explore the facts, problems and impacts derived from 
administrative empowerment, fiscal empowerment, and monitoring system on the 
local government by the central government.  
 
A.  Administrative Empowerment 
 
Administrative empowerment is transfer of duties from central to local government in 
order to improve access and more responsive service. After the decentralization, we 
can see there are gains in service quality and quantity but not in every district or 
municipality. Since the public service delivery is now directly in the hands of local 
government, citizens have found it easier to express concerns about the quality of 
services and to demand more.  
 
 Nevertheless, the quantity and quality of service delivery continues to be 
uneven across regions and sectors, with improvements in some areas and deterioration 
in others.  Generally, however, local governments have managed to maintain the level 
of service that the central government used to provide.  
 
 The decentralization law gives delegation of duty/authority to the regions. The 
process of delegation of authority gives local governments the power to conduct 
restructuring of certain service sectors and to stimulate greater awareness of the needs 
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for and benefits of effective and efficient services. 
 
Figure 6. Division of Authority in Implementing Government Services Between 
Central and Regional Governments Based on Management Principle Functions 
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         Source: SMERU, 2002 
 
Commonly there are increasing receptivity and openness of local governments. 
Local government acceptance of criticism and complaints is on the rise. This results in 
more responsiveness to demands for accelerating change and increasing access to 
information on services. Such transparency will enable the local government to reduce 
invisible costs.  
 
After the implementation of regional autonomy, some local governments have 
created a simpler bureaucracy for their public services. It has resulted a shorter string 
of desk and offices, rationalized work hours, and greater transparency in some regions. 
Simplification is especially apparent in the case of licensing services, which have 
become much easier and more efficient. Mostly, licensing services are now conducted 
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under one roof. The central government also encourages the district and municipality 
level government to establish One Stop Service Units for this purpose. In addition, a 
priority on rational division of labor has resulted in wider delegation of administrative 
responsibility and authority. For instance is the recognition of kelurahan (village) as 
an important player in providing public services, even taking spearhead role in sectors 
such as health services, and with the village repositioning itself related to the service 
delivery function.  
 
There are also improvements in certain public services. Local governments are 
starting to pay more attention to public services. The desire to improve service 
delivery encourages positive competition among different service delivery units. 
Therefore, some services provided by local government have improved. Public 
services for which local government pays are typically related to health, public 
administration and security.  
 
The access of information is improving. Since the implementation of the 
regional autonomy law, some information on public services, previously unavailable, 
is now accessible to the public. For instance, there is clearer information about fees 
and the schedule of government services, like the processing of ID cards and business 
licenses. This is an important step towards greater transparency by public service 
providers. Thus decentralization has created more barriers to acts of corruption and 
retribution on the part of local government officials and other personnel, particularly 
in cases where fees for particular services are transparent. Nonetheless, corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism at the local level remain.  
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The sense of public control of services is increasing. Decentralization has 
generated a significant improvement in the interaction between the people and the 
local government, resulting in closer relations. It has also increased the public 
demands for the improvement of local government services. As the society becomes 
more critical, it can directly evaluate the quality of services provided. This process 
then opens opportunities for the public to provide feedback on the performance of the 
bureaucracy that is responsible for providing those services.  In some areas, the local 
legislative and bupatis are more open to people’s concern over public services and are 
becoming more responsive to people’s demands for better services.  However, 
response to citizen complaints is not yet widespread. 
 
There is an emerging awareness of the importance of public service standards. 
One indication of the growing recognition of the value of minimum service standards 
for local governments is the action of the Ministry of Efficient Use State Apparatus in 
establishing a flexible tool that serves as standard of services. Another is a governor’s 
advice that each unit in the local government establishes a standard of services for 
each service delivered.  Such advice was translated into a regulation requiring a 
minimum of six working hours a day for public office staffs. 
 
However, problems are also emerging. One of them is system barriers. The 
lack of public service standards makes it very difficult for local governments to define 
quality services and determine whether they are providing them.  This is further 
aggravated by the bad work ethic of some employees and the fact that there is little 
funding in the local government budget for public services. 
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There is also tension between revenue objectives and service objective. Many 
local governments focus on increasing their income rather than improving public 
services.  This is exacerbated when public officials engage in corruption that channels 
resources away from public service.   Continuing tension between revenue and service 
objectives will prevent the sustainability of improvements in public services.  
 
1.  Local Government’s Duties in Providing Public Services  
 
Administrative empowerment also provides authority to local government to improve 
better services for their people in their own region. Service delivery did not break 
down, and in some ways expanded. Contrary to widely-shared fears, there were even 
indications that local governments are beginning to pay more attention to public 
services, and that they are committed to improving service delivery. Some local 
governments are developing new initiatives, including several that serve the interests 
of vulnerable groups such as women, children and the elderly. In this chapter we also 
evaluate some of services that provided by local governments after decentralization.  
 
• Health 
 
Most of health programs implemented in the regions are a continuation of those 
delivered prior to decentralization. One example is the Posyandu, a service program 
for maternal and childcare provided periodically in almost all villages. Coordinated by 
health supervisors, this program penetrates the neighborhood level because its 
delivery is not dependent on the presence of medical professionals whose number is 
usually limited, but on posyandu cadres such as housewives and other volunteers. 
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Another example is the kartu miskin, a card issued to the poor citizens for free health 
services as part of the “social safety net.” In general, local governments are trying to 
keep the same level of services. 
 
 Autonomy has encouraged several regions to improve health services despite 
limited resources. Some local governments expanded the scope of their health 
services by upgrading health centers to higher levels, with corresponding increases in 
resources. 
 
 Regional autonomy also allows local governments to adjust their services to 
what they see as local needs. Local governments are currently choosing to deliver 
some or all of the 18 health services that the central government used to provide (such 
as nutrition, mother and child health care, family planning, control of epidemic, basic 
health care, management of health centers, laboratory services, and advancement of 
traditional medicine, among others). 
 
 There are initiatives in several regions to establish their own minimum service 
standards in health. In the absence of a presidential decree, the Ministry of Health has 
issued Ministerial Decree 1107/2000 that outlines the indicators for health services. 
Some provincial governments did their part as representatives of the central 
government in setting and promulgating these standards, and the local governments 
are using them as guidelines. 
 
 Civil society is playing an increasing role in health care service delivery, 
either independently or in cooperation with other parties. Local governments are 
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exploring partnerships with civil society organizations and the private sector in 
enhancing the delivery of health services. 
 
 Yet problems also hinder the sustainability of health service delivery such as 
budget limitations, lack of medical personnel and facilities. This is a function no 
budget limitations and is affecting service delivery capacity. Another is limited 
transparency in operations. There are suspicions of corruption like misuse of funds 
because of the limited transparency in health operations. For instance, it is believed 
that some of the kartu miskin which allow holders to get free medicines and other 
services do not really get into the hands of the poor.  
 
 In several cases, the Local Agency for Health Affairs and local parliament 
(DPRD) members have different perceptions about performance in the health sector. 
There is limited understanding of maternal and child health issues among members of 
DPRD. This hampers the allocation of more resources in the local budget that the 
DPRD approves. 
 
 The intent of the decentralization policy is to increase capacity at the local 
government level, with the central government providing facilitation rather than 
direction. However, central government is providing even less training and technical 
assistance than it did prior to decentralization. 
 
 Local governments allocate limited resources for programs to improve human 
resource capacity. This is because resource allocation reflects an emphasis on physical 
facilities construction, such as public health centers or hospitals. Current budget 
 57
allocation provides insufficient funding for further developing, maintaining, and 
implementing maternal and child health programs. 
 
 The quality of health services differs from one area to another. In general, 
there are needs for improvement in the quality of both health workers and services. 
This is a consequence of insufficient numbers of medical personnel in terms of area 
needs, as well as poor basic facilities. The distribution of medical workers and health 
facilities is uneven, with especially serious consequences in remote areas. 
 
 The dominant mind set is still that maternal health and child health are 
women’s issues, and therefore should be handled only by women. This eventually has 
an impact on budget allocation and program development processes, to which women 
continue to have limited access. 
 
• Education 
 
Regional autonomy has opened opportunities for local governments to take initiatives 
and be creative in improving education services. While trying to make sure that basic 
education is provided for the first nine years, local governments have also found 
creative means to provide other programs, taking into account the unique needs of 
each community. In the arena of formal education, some local governments are 
establishing schools that provide special services for excellent students.  
 
 Special programs are also emerging in non-formal education. For example, 
Kabupaten Deli Serdang introduced the “Society Learning Hour” program with the 
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leadership of the Local Agency on Educational Affairs. The program was designed to 
encourage children to study at least two hours a day. A monitoring team oversees 
program implementation. In addition Kota Salatiga set up the “Community Learning 
Activity Center,” a non-formal education program for those who are out of formal 
school. The center offers skills on entrepreneurship, specifically meant to develop 
capacity to market products made by the local community. The center also serves as a 
“trading post” for local products. 
  
 Some local governments are trying to keep education affordable. By law, 
public education is free in elementary and high school, but students pay for 
miscellaneous fees, and school fees tend to increase. In Kabupaten Kutai Kertanegara, 
the local government decreed that everything would be free and paid for everything 
from the local budget. 
 
 Local governments recognize the need for quality instruction. Some regions 
have provided scholarships to teachers to encourage them to develop their teaching 
skills. In partnership with universities, some local governments initiated a program for 
improving the quality of teachers through cooperative programs for S1 (undergraduate 
degree) and S2 (master’s degree). Local budget funding will support the degree 
programs. 
 
 Local governments are using incentives to attract teachers. There are many 
incentive schemes such as new salaried positions, holiday bonuses, uniforms, and 
cash subsidies. Local governments are shouldering the costs to retain current teachers 
and attract new ones. 
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  Local governments have entered into cooperation with the private sector and 
communities to improve the quality of education services and facilities. These 
partnerships involve a range of participation, from advisory services and education 
policy formulation to specific initiatives like construction of buildings. 
 
 The existing forums for education stakeholders are being strengthened. The 
revitalization of local school boards, which have existed since before decentralization, 
and the creation of new ones in regions where they were not yet set up are positive 
developments. Both local governments and the private sector realize that this body 
can be fully maximized as a forum for education stakeholders in the era of 
decentralization. Almost all regions have local school board. The school board is a 
venue for citizens and the local government to interact on matters relating to 
education programs and discuss public aspirations about education. Thus, it 
contributes to greater transparency in government operations, which will likely 
improve the quality and implementation of education services. 
 
 Problems are emerging in education service delivery by local government. 
These include the increasing of school fees. Increases in school fees are attributed to 
decisions of the local school boards, which have a semi-autonomous authority to 
manage and conduct educational activities. It is not yet apparent if increasing school 
fees will translate to better quality education. Service standard for education remains 
unclear. The Ministry of Education has not clearly communicated its minimum 
standard to local governments. The local governments report awareness that central 
government is formulating education standards but are unaware of how to implement 
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them.  
 
 In general, priority programs in the education sector reflect national policies. 
However, each region has the right to determine the local contents of its curricula. 
Perceptions differ on the definition of local contents. Some local governments define 
it in terms of local language and local cultures. Others define it in terms of local needs. 
For example, teaching English can be the local content as long as this is in line with 
local needs. 
 
 The implementation of educational autonomy suffers from inadequate 
socialization, poor understanding, and a weak legal basis. The school-based 
management system and education boards are not yet functioning to the maximum 
extent or playing a significant role. 
 
 Lack of funds has always constrained local governments in improving their 
education services. The result is school buildings in very poor condition, as well as 
limited education equipment and libraries to support teaching and learning. Contrary 
to the spirit of regional autonomy, the central government still controls a large portion 
of funds for education. 
 
 The number and quality of teachers remain the main problems in education 
sector, particularly for natural sciences and foreign languages (English). There are 
discrepancies between teacher competence and subjects taught. 
 
 The distribution of teachers continues to be uneven. Some big cities have a 
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teacher surplus, while the opposite is true in some rural and remote areas. 
Compounding this problem is the preference of local governments to recruit from 
local ethnic groups. This reinforces the Ministry of Education’s position that it should 
retain authority over teacher distribution. 
 
 To overcome the lack of teachers, many local governments have recruited 
contract teachers supported by APBD funds. These teachers are not on the regular 
government payroll and do not receive regular government allowance and pension 
benefits. 
 
 The budgetary allocation for the nine-year compulsory education program is 
inadequate. Although it has increased in many regions, the resulting funds have gone 
mainly to salaries and maintenance, rather than to educational programs. Meanwhile 
the sparsely populated areas remain difficult to serve. Therefore, education has 
become more expensive, given inadequate local government budgets and the 
numerous obligatory miscellaneous fees. 
 
• Public Works 
 
Local governments determine priority programs in the public works sector according 
to regional needs and potentials. Opinions of the Local Agency on Public Works and 
other local government institutions differ regarding the function of the agency as the 
organization in charge of implementing physical construction. 
 
 Nonetheless, public involvement ranks lowest in the public works sector, 
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particularly in the planning process. Efforts to involve the local society through the 
construction service contractors association have suggested collusion. 
 
• Trade and Industry 
 
In many districts or municipalities, one dinas manages trade and industry sectors as 
well as cooperatives (and in some places, investment). Consequently, this dinas has 
become the backbone for citizens’ involvement in the public-based economy and for 
empowering small and medium entrepreneurships as well as small scale industries. 
 
 Local officials lack some critical technical capacities, especially to provide 
training or technical assistance on specific subjects such as business management, 
product marketing, and operating machines. Some local governments are forming 
partnerships with research institutions, NGOs, or the business community to make 
this assistance available to local businesses. 
 
• Agriculture 
 
Regional autonomy has encouraged several local governments to develop service 
programs in agriculture based on local needs and potentials. They are strengthening 
and modifying existing credit programs for farmers. To support more locally based 
agricultural programs, some local governments are establishing development centers 
to support other agricultural products. 
 
 Some local governments have developed programs specifically to support 
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women farmers for the first time. Regional autonomy has encouraged several regions 
to enter into partnerships with the private sector for mutual support in addressing 
agricultural issues. The objective is to increase productivity in predominantly 
agricultural sites.  
 
 Agricultural Field Workers (Petugas Penyuluh Lapangan—PPL) and farmer 
assistants are still considered the backbone of agricultural program implementation, 
particularly in representing public aspirations, improving the capability of farmers and 
farmer groups, and socializing programs of the Local Agency of Agriculture. 
Nevertheless, there is Limited technical capacity of local governments to address 
agricultural issues. As the regional agricultural development plans become more and 
more localized, there is a growing need for more specialized technical assistance, 
specifically in the form of the PPL. Limited financial resources are cited as a barrier 
to hiring more PPLs. 
 
 Problems that hampered agriculture services can be illustrate because there is 
no national framework for agriculture, in example a national policy or minimum 
standard. Agriculture is one area where local governments urgently need such a 
framework. To respond to their immediate problems, they need to understand the 
macro level policy on agriculture. The strategy of the local governments can be 
effective only if designed in the context of a national strategy. 
 
 Farmers associations need revitalization to institutionalize public involvement 
in the agricultural sector. The main problem is inconsistent public enthusiasm for 
attending association activities. Another problem is that some people use the 
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associations for their own personal interests. 
 
 In order to streamline local government structures, some areas have integrated 
other sectors, such as fisheries, plantations, cattle farming, and forestry into the 
agricultural sector. This has increased the tasks and functions of the institution 
operating the agricultural sector. However, these tasks and functions need different 
expertise and skills, which agricultural agency staffs do not have. 
 
• Forestry 
 
Numerous issues related to forestry affairs affect the formulation of priority programs 
by local governments. These include forest management democracy, conservation, 
rehabilitation, critical lands, central management, and the potential of the forests to 
increase regional income. 
 
 Issued related to forest management democracy have brought about a new 
paradigm in forestry programs, namely “Forest for Society.” This involves members 
of local society as the main stakeholders in each forestry activity and as the ones who 
benefit most from forest yield management. 
 
 There are regulations in the forestry sector that are inconsistent with Law 
22/1999, causing conflicts of authority and interests. Lack of response from central 
government on local forestry regulations has caused legal conflicts and problems in 
local areas, particularly when a local regulation already issued was later determined to 
conflict with national regulations. Local government has demanded that the provincial 
 65
government act as a facilitator to avoid conflicts. 
 
 The main obstacles to forestry management are poor quality and insufficient 
numbers of technical workers in Local Agency on Forestry Affairs. Meanwhile apart 
from the APBD, Special Allocation Funds originating from the Reforestation Fund 
are the main source of financial support for the local agencies of forestry affairs in 
implementing their function. Local governments have complained about late 
disbursement and being lower than expected. 
 
• Environment 
 
Local government priority programs are generally consistent with the framework of 
the programs determined by the Ministry of Environment, which emphasize good 
environmental management and administration. However, in some areas have a more 
specific focus, such as management of environmental problems, including solid and 
liquid wastes; natural disaster management, particularly flood and landslides; and 
garbage disposal management. 
 
 Since decentralization, the functions of local working units managing the 
environmental sector have expanded to include technical implementation as well as 
monitoring, not only administration. 
 
 The local governments have begun to provide wider opportunities for local 
society participation in the environment sector, not just in planning, but also in 
management and monitoring. 
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  The quality of personnel in the environmental sector remains poor. Local 
governments have responded with several initiatives, including supporting formal 
bachelor and master’s level education for local government staffs, conducting training 
on environmental impact analysis, providing training in cooperation with higher 
education institutions, and using technical assistance from donors. 
 
 Other factor that becomes obstacle is limited environmental management 
capacity of local governments. This hampers local efforts to address environmental 
degradation. Horizontal inter-governmental cooperation is under-developed. Many 
environmental problems cut across local government boundaries and territorial 
jurisdictions. Capacity constraints in turn limit intergovernmental coordination. There 
is also lack of clear national and local government framework on the environment. 
Local governments need a national framework for environment to use as a guide. This 
framework could be in the form of a national policy or minimum standard that 
provides the overall direction for the environment sector. It could also serve as the 
basis for local environmental planning and budgeting. Local government 
environmental strategies can be effective only if designed in the context of a national 
strategy. 
 
 Funds for environmental programs are limited. Environment gets a smaller 
proportion of the budget than education, health, and agriculture. This suggests that 
local governments place a low priority on environmental management. Meanwhile, 
there is competing priorities between revenue generating measures and environmental 
conservation. Local governments see forests and other resources as sources of 
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revenues. Many have not paid serious attention to the environmental impact of such 
natural resource exploitation. 
 
• Tourism 
 
Priority programs generally include construction and development of tourism 
facilities and services, tourism management and tourism promotion. Nonetheless, the 
central and provincial governments are still dominant in formulating tourism 
programs and activities, since tourism often involves cross-boundary issues, such as 
road access, and cannot be managed by a single local government. Unfortunately, the 
tourism development programs and projects funded by the central or provincial 
government are frequently not well coordinated with those planned at the local 
government level. Therefore, the districts and municipalities often have to alter their 
planned projects or programs to suit the policies of higher government levels. 
 
• Transportation 
 
The construction of basic facilities, particularly roads and bridges, is among the main 
priorities for all regions, including those prioritized in marine transportation. This 
involves significant cooperation with the Local Agency on Public Works as the 
technical implementing agent. 
 
 Despite these commonalities, priority programs in the transportation sector 
usually reflect area-specific characteristics. In some regions, local port management 
remains problematic because of disagreement among central, provincial, and local 
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government regarding port authority. 
 
 The implementation of priority programs is still not efficient for several 
reasons. One is the delay of the central government in transferring Personnel, Funds, 
Instruments, and Documentation (Personil, Pembiayaan, Peralatan dan 
Dokumentasi—P3D). Another is that some central legal regulations impede 
implementation. 
 
• Investment 
 
Many local governments consider investment as one of the most significant sectors 
for increasing their revenue. Thus, programs like promoting the local potentials (such 
as natural resources, manufacturing facilities, or other investment opportunities), 
streamlining licensing services, and conducting entrepreneurship meetings have 
become the main concerns of Investment Local Agencies. 
 
 A number of local governments have initiated activities to promote their 
regions for domestic and international investment. In trying to raise more funds, local 
governments continue their efforts to attract investors, both domestic and international. 
Kabupatens/kotas are increasingly creative in promoting their potentials. They have 
produced books, leaflets, and even official websites which can be easily accessed by 
the public, especially investors. These materials contain information about 
kabupaten/kota profiles, investment opportunities, and licensing services and 
procedures.  
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 Local governments have made serious efforts to provide uncomplicated 
licensing procedures and services. Many have established one-stop-services, making 
business licensing simple and quick. This increases effectiveness and efficiency as 
well as transparency and accountability in licensing processes, and has high potential 
to attract investors and business to the region. Some local governments have created 
venues and approaches to develop a better picture of their customers (local 
businesses) as well as investors’ needs, and to solicit feedback. 
 
 Thus the there is also emergence of inter-governmental cooperation for 
investment purposes. Some local governments have ventured into cooperative 
agreements with other regions in order to coordinate investment. 
 
 However, problems are found such as insufficient licensing authority devolved 
to the local governments. The central government still has the authority to issue 
investment licenses. While local governments are anxious to attract foreign investors, 
their lack of authority to issue licenses could delay investment. Control of central 
government for land affairs is also becoming problem for local governments. Some 
investments are connected to the availability of land in the regions. The fact that local 
governments continue to have no power over land affairs, is a constraint in attracting 
investors. 
 
 Local civil society members are apathetic about licensing procedures. Unless 
directly affected, they do not participate in the policy-making process related to 
licensing systems. In the mean time, some business owners tend to use middlemen to 
smooth and speed up the licensing process. This behavior hampers efforts to establish 
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transparent and effective one-stop service centers. In addition the business 
associations that can advocate for better licensing procedures are not fully functional 
and involved. Even some regions have shown their effort to improve the services, 
there is no mechanism for business owners to submit their complaints or demand 
improvements in licensing services. 
 
• Civil Registry 
 
Civil registration is a local government service. There is a national standard for the 
procedures and the associated forms, but local governments have some leeway in how 
they implement the service. Local governments have progressed toward meeting the 
standards, although differences in service quantity and quality continue to hamper 
uniformity. 
 
 Central government policies regarding civil documentation continue to be 
developed. There is a current parliamentary debate over a draft population and family 
welfare bill which touches on documentation issues. However, the debate seems to be 
limited to a small circle, with little involvement of local governments and 
communities. 
 
 Some local civil registration service officials engage in practices that are 
detrimental to developing better government. They view providing these services as a 
means to make additional income. The absence of a sufficiently transparent and 
accountable system permits these practices to occur. One consequence is that citizens 
may choose not to seek their civil registry documents, despite the knowledge of their 
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importance.  
 
2.  Transfer of Personnel from Central to Local Government 
 
One of outcomes of the decentralization process is a massive excess of around 2.1 
million central government employees who are being transferred to regional levels of 
government both at the provincial, as well as the district and municipal levels of 
administration. Around half of these government personnel are school teachers. There 
are also provincial level employees in many districts and municipalities who will be 
transferred to district and municipal governments. This transfer represents more a 
change in status than a physical transfer because most of these government officials 
are already based in the regions. 
 
Table 3. Public Sector Employment in Indonesia 
(millions) 
 Year of 1999  
(Before 
Decentralization) 
Year of 2001 
(After 
Decentralization)
Public Sector 5.4 5.5 
 State Enterprise 1.0 1.0 
 General Government 4.5 4.4 
  Military and Police 0.5 0.5 
  Civil Servants* 4.1 3.9 
   Central 3.6 1.3 
   Regional 0.5 2.6 
Civil servants as share of population 1.9% 1.9% 
Regional civil servants as share of total civil servants 12.2% 66.7% 
* Civilian civil servants excluding health and education workers 
Source: National Agency of Civil Service Administration (BKN) 
 
The transfer of personnel from the center to the regions has already been 
carried out, however a number of problems are beginning to emerge. Discrepancies 
have been found between the number of employees counted by local governments in 
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their staff inventories, and the figures released by the National Agency of Civil 
Service Administration (BKN). In several provinces BKN has reported a higher 
number of employees, compared with employee data produced by local governments. 
 
At present there are questions regarding the extent of such discrepancies, and 
whether the high numbers of extra officials can be explained as inadvertent mistakes. 
A more cynical explanation is that the recording of incorrect data was deliberate and 
aimed at claiming the salaries of these ‘phantom’ civil servants. Because the phantom 
civil servants have been recorded at the central government level, their salaries have 
been paid out based on central government data. It is unclear, however, where the 
money has gone because these 'phantom' employees clearly do not exist at the local 
level. The case of 'phantom' personnel is only one of many problems that need to be 
addressed by the central and local governments as they implement decentralization. 
 
 Despite the uncertain number, the local government has to manage the large 
number of personnel transferred from the central government. These personnel were 
already in the regions, but local governments are now responsible for paying their 
salaries. They have integrated large numbers of staff by reorganizing and restructuring 
agencies and units, without necessarily downsizing. They are adopting structures that 
are simple but rich in functions, reorganizing the local bureaucracy to increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public services and bring them closer to the people. 
They are beginning to seek ways to enhance personnel capability through training. 
  
 Local governments are upgrading the skills of their personnel through various 
types of training and support for post-graduate schooling. Local government 
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employees are beginning to understand that promotions will eventually be based on 
merit and skills. They also recognize that equipping themselves with new skills will 
make them more competitive in terms of professional advancement. Training and 
education programs have provided some benefits, but programs to improve technical 
skills are limited. 
 
 In general, there are no reductions in personnel, and some local governments 
have even made new hires. Although the General Allocation Fund (DAU) calculation 
was based on existing personnel, new personnel have been hired to carry out new 
functions. 
 
 However, the absence of guidance on down-sizing became problem to local 
government. The discrepancy between personnel needs and availability continues to 
limit the ability of local governments to recruit the staff they really need to carry out 
policy formulation and service delivery. Inter-are mobility of personnel is still limited, 
given its consequences for the local budget. Current central government guidelines 
limit inter-are devolution of personnel as well as the number of positions, offices, and 
technical bureaus. Central government has yet to provide permission and 
implementation guidance for sorely needed down-sizing. 
 
 Strict rules on determining the number of working units and the stringent 
structure of positions in the hierarchical system limit local government’s ability to 
define and respond to actual organizational needs of personnel. This is because of 
inflexible rules and regulations. 
 
 74
 Other obstacle in local civil service management is insufficient capacity in 
performance evaluation. Although performance evaluation instruments such as 
LAKIP (Performance Accountability Report of Government Institution) are widely 
used, they are not as useful as they might be because many personnel lack 
competence in applying them. The result is that the public considers it difficult to 
obtain accurate descriptions of local government performance. Additionally there is 
inadequate attention to area management. This is the result of the continuing 
dominance of local government personnel in local policy formulation.  The last is 
limited funding. Since most funding is allocated for government operation and service 
provision, only little budget available to improve the capacities of personnel.  
 
B.  Fiscal Empowerment 
 
Fiscal empowerment means the transfer of money from central government to local 
governments. Fiscal empowerment will enable local governments to take the right 
steps for over all growth with equity. The empowerment brings government truly 
closer to the people. It is also aligned with increasing demand of accountability. 
 
Law 32/2004 provided authority of local governments to manage their own 
finances.  Also included are provisions for the separation of legislative and executive 
functions, which steered the DPRD to get more involved in setting the regional laws 
on budget as well as in establishing priorities in development plans. Moreover, the 
requirement that the executive prepare an Accountability Report creates expectations 
in all sectors that certain needs will have to be met in the budget planning. This also 
encouraged efforts towards efficiency in the executive expenses budget as well as 
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more transparent executive responses to public demands. 
 
Before the implementation of decentralization, there were two types of grants 
and subsidies allocated by the central government. The first allocation was used for 
routine expenditure, such as local government civil service salaries as well as for 
bureaucratic expenditure at the kabupaten/kota levels of government. The second type 
of allocation covered funds that are directed for the purpose of investment or 
government development expenditure. 
 
For routine expenditure purposes, the budgets were transferred through 
subsidies from the central government. This subsidy was the main source of direct 
income for the local governments. Table 4 provides the structure of local Government 
revenues before decentralization in several kotas/kabupatens, where for the fiscal year 
1999/2000 this contributed about 60% of total local governments’ revenues. 
 
For investment or development expenditure purposes, the budgets were 
transferred in two different types of subsidies. The first type was in the form of grants 
that were allocated for specific purposes designed by the central government, such as 
to build schools and health facilities at the kabupaten level. The second type of 
allocation was in the forms of block grants that could be used according to the needs 
of kabupaten/kota without any intervention from the central government. However, 
the amount of this type of subsidy was much less than the former. Total fund for 
investment purposes is only contributing approximately 20% of kabupaten/kota 
revenue. In addition to these two kinds of fund transferred, the central government 
also provided local government with a share of tax and non-tax revenues that 
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contributed less than 10% of kabupaten/kota total revenues. The use of these funds 
was fully controlled by the local government. The remaining 10% of kabupaten/kota 
income was derived from local revenues (PAD) and other insignificant sources. 
 
Table 4. Structure of Local Government Revenues before Decentralization 
(FY 1999/2000 in percentage share) 
Kabupaten / 
Kota 
Tax & 
non-tax 
Revenue 
sharing 
Routine 
Budget 
Subsidy
Development 
Funds 
Local 
Source of 
Revenues 
Others 
Total 
Revenues 
(billion 
Rupiahs) 
1. Banjarmasin* 11.90 52.47 17.82 17.24 0.57 87.3
2. Bolmong 8.71 66.14 22.00 3.16 0.00 72.3
3. Gorontalo 10.10 66.01 21.33 2.55 0.00 94.2
4. Karo 9.75 65.25 15.59 9.41 0.00 75.4
5. Kudus 6.92 61.77 15.77 15.33 0.41 78.7
6. West Lombok 6.61 46.77 32.09 14.48 0.05 101.1
7. Magetan 10.09 70.27 13.71 5.76 0.17 97.3
8. Minahasa 10.96 75.20 11.01 2.83 0.00 139.8
9. Sukabumi* 7.31 51.88 24.10 14.59 2.12 56.9
10. Sanggau 7.34 59.79 30.36 2.03 0.47 86.0
11. Solok 6.66 56.54 33.46 2.96 0.39 90.5
12. Simalungun 12.63 65.14 18.77 3.46 0.00 144.8
Note: *) Kota 
 
Source: SMERU, 2001 
 
In the past, the central government transferred money to the regions not only 
through the local government administration, but also through its “vertical” offices 
operating in the regions. The deconcentrated offices of the central government were 
financed through the central budget. This funding was commonly known as DIK5 for 
recurrent spending and DIP6 for development spending. The amount was much higher 
than the total revenues received by local government. Table 5 provides average 
figures of total central governments budgets allocated to all regions during the 1990s. 
In terms of percentage of GDP, the total funds allocated to the DIP was 5.2% of GDP. 
                                                          
5 DIK is Daftar Isian Kegiatan. The budget for routine spending. 
6 DIP is Daftar Isian Proyek. Project list that every financial year financed by central government 
through technical department. Central office of technical department allocates further to its office 
operating in kabupaten and kota level. 
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This was considerably higher than the total grants and subsidies allocated for routine 
and development expenditures which were only 3.5% of GDP.  
 
Table 5. Transferred Funds to Kabupaten/Kota Level: 
Expressed as a Percentage of GDP (Average Figures During the 1990s) 
 
Items Percentage of GDP: 
A.  Transferred to local government: 
- For routine budget 
- For development budget 
B.  Transferred to central government 
vertical institutions operating at the 
district level 
C.  Total (A+B) 
3.5% 
(2.2%) 
(1.3%) 
5.2% 
 
 
8.7% 
 
Source: SMERU, 2001 
 
 
These budgets, however, are no longer transferred under the decentralized 
system. As a result of the decentralization policy, all “vertical” government offices at 
the kabupaten level are automatically becoming part of the local government 
administration. They have been included in the new organizational structure of 
regional governments at the kabupaten/kota level. The budgetary implications of this 
new positioning these former “vertical” agencies is that both routine and development 
budgets will be managed by local government. In this case, the local government will 
use the new block grants for this purpose.  
 
After decentralization the local governments have autonomy in finance 
management. Local governments and regions have more in fund management. 
According to the Law 33/2004, the allocated funds from the central government are 
block grants to be used by the local government according to their own priorities. This 
is contrary to the mechanism applied by the central government prior to the 
implementation of regional autonomy, where the local government only carried out 
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those programs designed by the central government. 
 
In the new system, central-regional transfers remain the dominant means of 
financing. Even there is increasing use of contingency tax (PAD, local own revenue) 
for direct development—by expanding the scope of their taxes and user charges to 
increase local own revenue—local governments are still largely dependent on fund 
transfers from the central government.  
 
Law 33/2004 designates four sources of local government revenues: (1) 
locally generated revenues from taxes and user charges (PAD); (2) the Equalization 
Fund; (3) regional loans; and (4) other income. The Equalization Fund is made up of 
(1) the General Allocation Fund (DAU), (2) the Special Allocation Fund (DAK), and 
(3) revenue sharing from land and building taxes, fees from acquisition of land and 
buildings, and share in natural resources such as forests, mining, fisheries, oil, and gas. 
 
Table 6. DAU Dominates 
(Revenues of the Regions FY2001-2003, Rp. trillion and percent) 
 FY2001
(budget)
FY2001 
(outcome)
FY2002
(budget)
FY2003 
(submitted) 
Percent of 
total (2003) 
DAU 60.5 60.5 69.1 75.4 64.1
Contingency/Balancing 
Funds 
6.0 3.0 2.0 8.1 4.1
Shared Revenues 20.3 21.2 24.6 25.9 22.4
Special Autonomy Grants 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.5 0.9
Special Allocation Fund 
(DAK) 
0.9 0.7 0.8 2.3 1.2
Total Regional Transfers 87.7 85.4 97.8 113.2 92.6
Regional Own Revenues 
(PAD) 
7.0 7.0 7.6 9.0 7.4
Total Revenues 94.6 92.4 105.4 122.2 100
 
Source: World Bank, 2003 
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The bulk of regional government spending is financed by transfers from the 
center as indicated in Table 6. Over 90 percent of regional revenues comes from the 
Equalization Fund. 
 
The General Allocation Fund (DAU) is the foundation of the fiscal 
empowerment from central to local government. The grant constitutes some 65% of 
regional revenues, and a little over 70% of all central transfers to regions. The pool of 
money available to the DAU is by law a minimum of 25% of central government 
revenues after tax sharing. The 25% is a minimum share for the regions, but it is also 
the actual share approved by Parliament. Local governments receive 90% of the DAU 
pool, reflecting their importance under Law 32/2004, while the provinces receive 10%. 
Neither the 25% share of total revenues, nor the division of the DAU over provinces 
and local governments was based on a thorough analysis of the expenditure needs of 
the regions. When the decentralization law was passed, the expenditure assignments 
were not yet known, nor was there sufficient information on how much was actually 
spent on functions. The regulations suggest that the 25% is the share of actual revenue 
after revenue sharing, but until now 25% of the budgeted amount was actually 
distributed. In the Table 7, we can see the DAU block grant and transferred funds 
before decentralization in several kotas/kabupatens, that generally, all 
kotas/kabupatens received a much higher amount of DAU compared to the total funds 
received in FY1999/2000, the last year before the implementation of decentralization. 
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Table 7. DAU Block Grant and Transferred Funds Before Decentralization 
(in billion rupiah) 
Kota / Kabupaten DAU Block Grant Transferred funds in FY 1999/2000 
Increase 
(%) 
1. Banjarmasin* 127.9 72.3 76.9 
2. Bolmong 140.8 70.0 101.1 
3. Gorontalo 148.6 91.8 61.9 
4. Tanah Karo 92.5 68.3 35.4 
5. Kudus 175.6 66.8 162.9 
6. West Lombok 165.1 86.4 91.1 
7. Magetan 208.9 91.7 127.8 
8. Minahasa 260.4 135.8 91.8 
9. Sukabumi* 81.3 48.6 67.3 
10. Sanggau 192.4 84.3 128.2 
11. Solok 150.8 87.9 71.6 
12. Simalungun 260.3 139.8 86.2 
Note: *) Kota 
 
Source: SMERU, 2001 
 
The DAU allocation to individual provinces and local governments is in 
principle determined by formula. There are two formulae—one for the provinces and 
one for the local governments—but they are similar enough to discuss as if they are 
one. The formulae must take into account the regions’ needs and “economic 
potential,” which was interpreted to mean “expenditure needs” and “revenue 
capacity,” which according to the explanation of Law 33/2004 should be based on 
objective factors of needs and capacity. To base the grant allocation on such objective 
criteria is an attractive feature: it avoids “gap filling” between actual spending and 
actual revenues, and encourage regions to be cost effective and raise own revenues. 
Nonetheless, the transition to the new fiscal system and lack of data necessitated 
several transition elements in the DAU distribution in addition to the formula, 
including a “base amount” and a contingency allocation. Thus a region’s share of the 
DAU consists of three parts that are formula amount, base amount, and contingency. 
 
The share in the DAU pool for a region depends in principle on the “fiscal 
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gap,” the difference between its fiscal needs and its fiscal capacity. The choice of 
revenue capacity and expenditure needs rather than actual revenues and expenditure is 
desirable, as it gives the regions incentives to raise their own revenues, and save on 
spending. As indicators for expenditure need the formula includes: (i) population; (ii) 
poverty rate; (iii) land area; and (iv) the construction price index as an indicator of 
“geographical circumstances.” The formula must include these variables, as they are 
mentioned in the explanation of Law 33/2004. Fiscal capacity is defined as the sum of 
own revenues (PAD) and shared revenues. The formula has been changing from year 
to year. In the 2001 formula each of the variables was included with equal weight, 
whereas in the following years formula, population and area both received higher 
weights than the others.  
 
At the end of year 2001 the government realized that the distribution of the 
DAU according to “objective factors” could cause a major mismatch between 
devolved expenditure responsibilities and revenues. Devolved expenditures consisted 
largely of wages for civil servants in former central government offices, and some 
operations and maintenance spending. The distribution of these expenditures over the 
country was very different than the distribution of expenditure needs according to the 
new DAU formula. Because it was impossible for the regions to adjust their spending 
overnight, using only the formula risked major underfunding for numerous regions, 
and excess funding for others. To avoid this, the central government decided to hold 
the regions harmless compared to the year 2000, and introduced the “base amount” 
for that purpose. While well intended, the interpretation of the hold harmless clause 
was problematic. Rather than an amount below which no region could fall, it became 
a minimum grant, on top of which an amount according to the formula was allocated. 
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Consequently, the base amount took almost 80% of the total DAU pool. However the 
amount was reduced and turned into a minimum amount per region.   
 
In the mean time, the clause of “hold harmless” has caused misinterpretation 
in following years. Parliament objected against the proposed distribution of the DAU 
for next years, because some of the richer regions stood to lose compared to the 2001 
distribution. It decided that no region could receive less DAU than it did the year 
before. In principle this was a reasonable decision even though parliament’s 
interference with the DAU distribution was not foreseen by the Law. However, the 
trouble was that the 2001 DAU distribution had been distorted because of lack of data 
on revenue sharing. So by holding regions harmless compared to 2001, it allowed the 
regions that received shared revenues to “double dip”, to receive both and inflated 
DAU and their shared revenues. For the year 2001, the DAU was supplemented by a 
“contingency fund” to absorb any mismatch between devolved expenditure 
responsibilities and revenues.  
 
The Special Allocation Grant (DAK) is as of yet small. It consists of 5 types of 
grants which are forestry, education, health, rural roads and irrigation. In addition, 
new regions established in 2002 received a grant for public administration 
infrastructure. Law 32/2004 states that the DAK can be used for special needs of the 
regions, including emergencies, and for financing central priorities at the regional 
level. The forestry component is not really a special grant. Instead, it is the regional 
share of an allocated tax for reforestation. The funding consists of 40% of a forestry 
tax—meanwhile 60% is the central share—which is distributed on a derivation basis. 
The special allocation grants for education, health, rural roads and irrigation aim at 
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rehabilitation of existing facilities, and are distributed according to criteria which 
include the regions’ fiscal capacity. Regions are supposed to apply to the central 
government for the grant, with proposals that meet the allocation criteria. However, 
the 2003 allocations were based only on criteria developed by the central government. 
Given that the grants finance largely local tasks (maintenance of facilities for local 
functions) it is hard to see how these meet central objectives, as was intended in the 
law.  
 
The 2001 decentralization greatly increased the importance of shared revenues. 
The most important factor was the inclusion of oil and gas revenues and personal 
income tax in the taxes to be shared. The former were included to accommodate long-
standing dissatisfaction of natural resource rich regions which felt that central 
government took their resources, and did not give back anything in turn. With the 
implementation of decentralization law, they now receive a significant share of those 
revenues as indicated in Table 8 below. In addition, the personnel income tax was 
included for sharing. For each of these shared taxes, the province gets a minor part, 
whereas the bulk of revenues goes to the local governments. 
 
The sharing formulae for most revenues contain some element of equalization. 
For oil and gas, mining, and forestry, all local governments in the same province as 
the producing local government receive a share as well. For fisheries, property tax and 
land transfer tax, a small percentage of the revenue is shared by all local governments 
in Indonesia. These complex sharing mechanisms may well be redundant whatever a 
region gets from those shared taxes is counted as own fiscal capacity, and reduces the 
allocation of the DAU. 
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 Table 8. Revenue Sharing 
(Shared of revenues to central, provincial and regional government) 
Item Central Government 
Provincial 
Government
Originating 
Local 
Government
Other Local 
Governments 
in the same 
province 
All Local 
Governments 
in Indonesia 
(Equal Share)
Oil (non-tax, onshore) 85 3 6 6 -- 
LNG (non-tax, onshore) 70 6 12 6 -- 
Mining: Land-rent 20 16 64 -- -- 
Mining: Royalty 20 16 32 32 -- 
Forestry: Land -rent 20 16 64 -- -- 
Forestry: Resource rent 20 16 32 32 -- 
Fishery 20   -- 80 
Land and Building Tax 9a 16.2 64.8 -- 10b
Land and Building 
Transfer Fee 
 16 64 -- 20 
Personal Income Tax 80 8 12 -- -- 
a The central government’s share in the Land and Building Tax is supposed to cover administrative costs. 
Not all categories of personal income tax are shared: excluded are taxes on self-employed income, 
dividends, and interest. 
b According to Government Regulation 104/2000, of the 10 percent, 6.5 percent is shared equally among 
all regions, and 3.5 percent is distributed to those regions who exceeded their revenue target in the 
previous year. 
 
Source: World Bank, 2003 
 
There are a number of shared provincial taxes as well. Motor vehicle, vehicle 
transfer, and fuel excise tax are levied by the province, and shared with the local 
governments. Government Regulation 25/2000 gives the provincial government the 
right to distribute the local government share in an equalizing manner. However, the 
equalization effect of sharing these taxes compared to that of the DAU is likely to be 
small.  
 
Decentralization greatly expands the scope for locally raised revenue, which 
primarily consists of taxes, user charges and income from regional enterprises. Law 
18/1997, the previous law on regional taxes and levies, intended to stop the earlier 
practice of issuing an excess of regional taxes of regional taxes and charges. Many of 
these had little revenue potential, and high costs to the taxpayer and the economy. 
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Law 18/1997 therefore restricted regional taxes to a closed list, and made any 
additional tax proposals conditional upon approval of the Ministry of Finance. 
 
Law 34/2000— amendment to the Law 18/1997on Regional Taxes and Region
al Levies—reverses the burden of proof. The law still gives a list of regional taxes but 
regional governments can add taxes through regional regulations approved by the 
regional parliaments, as long as it stands by the principles mentioned in the law as 
shown in Table 9. The regions have made sufficient use of this option, and have 
issued numerous new taxes and levies by regional regulation. While this has 
contributed to an increase in regional own revenues by some 50 percent since the start 
of decentralization, own revenue are still a modest share of the total. Moreover, many 
taxes and levies are seen to be damaging the business environment. Even if they 
contradict the law, such taxes and charges are not always canceled by the central 
government because supervision is weak and up to 60 percent are implemented by the 
regions without central government review. Absent from the list of regional taxes is 
the land and building tax, which in Indonesia is still a central tax, collected by the 
central tax authorities, and then shared with the regions. 
 
Regarding to the regional borrowing, Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004 allow the 
regions to borrow. They were already allowed to do so before 2001—under the Law 
5/1974, but faced stricter approval procedures from the center. Now for domestic 
borrowing, only the local parliament has to approve, while indirect, rule-based 
controls limit borrowing. Regions are allowed to borrow from foreign sources with 
the permission of the central government, but without its guarantee. The regions are 
also allowed to borrow short term for cash flow management purposes.  
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 Table 9. Regional Taxes 
Type of Tax Assignment Max Rate Sharing 
Motorized Vehicles Province 5% 30% to local govt 
Motor Vehicle Transfer Tax Province 10% 30% to local govt 
Motorized Vehicles Fuel Province 5% 30% to local govt 
Utilization of Water Province 20% 70% to local govt 
Hotel Tax Local 10% 
Restaurant Tax Local 10% 
Entertainment Tax Local 35% 
Advertisement Tax Local 25% 
Street Lighting Local 10% 
Mining of C-Class Minerals Local 20% 
Parking Tax Local 20% 
A minimum of 10% of 
local government tax to be 
allocated to the relevant 
village. 
 
Source: Law 34/2000 
 
Beside of that, there are a variety of opportunities for increasing local 
government income. Aside from the fund transfers, local governments receive as 
contributions from State Owned Enterprises which operate in their areas, they are 
identifying new opportunities for revenue generation. Recognizing their flexibility to 
cooperate with private sectors, they have started to invite investors to develop the 
regions. They have also formulated new local regulations on taxes and retributions in 
their attempt to generate revenues. 
 
 Nevertheless there is unpredictable release of fund transfers from the central 
government to local governments. This makes it difficult to sustain services. Delays 
are also cited as the reason regions are imposing more local taxes and user charges to 
increase revenues. The collection of excessive taxes and user charges is hurting the 
community and local business. 
 
 Despite limited financial resources, local governments are maintaining the 
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services that they are expected to deliver and, in some sectors, increasing their 
expenditures. However the biggest portion of the local budget is allocated to salary. 
Salaries account for 57% of the budget. The next largest portion (25%) goes to 
“development” expenses, principally to the 11 fields of governance. 
 
 Due to structure of the budgetary system—the system is divided into the 
routine budget and the development budget—it is difficult to assess local 
government’s responsiveness to regional needs for services or government 
management. For example, it is hard to assess local government’s commitment to 
education directly, because all teacher expenses (which part of the service element) 
are part of the routine budget expenditure on personnel. There are communication 
limitations, both vertical and horizontal, among government institutions regarding 
their respective policies. This has made it difficult for local governments to obtain 
financial support, apart from the APBD, in the sectors for which they are now 
responsible. 
 
 In general, local governments use caution in budgeting. Standards have been 
formed for the use and allocation of local funds. Local governments are beginning to 
formulate more balanced budgets. Budgeting is more careful and stricter, especially 
for routine and development allocations. Financial planning involves the use of 
budgeting forms, which help rationalize the budget. 
 
 In the mean time, the role of local legislators in budgeting is increasing. This 
makes local legislator more flexible in setting priorities for development when they 
give inputs into development plans. Legislative control of local government expenses 
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is emerging. Mechanisms for legislative finance management are stricter. 
 
 Autonomy motivates people’s participation and the emergence of transparency 
in local finance management. Local finance is one area in which citizens are 
interested to be involved. There have been demands for public consultation in the 
formulation of the local budget draft (RAPBD). There are efforts to meet these 
demands. In some cases, local governments opened public debates on local budget 
allocation. Governments have also invited civil society organizations (CSOs) to help 
draft the local budget. The press plays a role in reporting on the use of local funds, 
and this encourages more transparency. 
 
 However there is lack of clarity and citizen participation in the planning and 
budgeting process. The budget reflects local government priorities, becoming final 
after it is passed as legislation by the DRPD. Because the budget process has not 
significantly involved citizens, civil society groups feel that the budget does not 
reflect the citizens’ aspirations. For example, budgets typically contain only minimal 
allocations for development and women’s empowerment. There are no 
institutionalized mechanisms for substantive citizen participation in the budget 
process, and the process as a whole lacks transparency. In almost all regions, citizen 
involvement is limited to attending the DPRD session when it is already scheduled to 
approve the budget. 
 
 Thus lack of clarity on the law. The budget management system still follows 
the old laws and does not yet accommodate the spirit of Laws 32 and 33.  While the 
law provides the framework for fiscal autonomy, local governments are constrained 
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by possible conflicts between local and national regulations that may result from the 
incompleteness of supporting regulations. 
 
 Additionally there is insufficient budgeting capacity. Many of the legislators 
neither understand nor are skilled in the budgeting procedures. The form of the local 
budget is complex. Another problem is persistent secrecy around the budget. The 
general perception remains that the local budget is a secret document and that citizens 
do not have access to financial information. Civil society groups are not adequately 
represented in local fiscal management, and there is limited socialization of local 
legislators related to revenue generation and budgeting. 
 
 The asset transfer process is unclear. There has been a formal transfer of assets, 
but in practice the transfer has yet to take effect. The status of many national 
government assets that are expected to be transferred to local government is not clear. 
There is little information available as to whether or not these have been sold. Some 
asset transfers are not validated by authentic documentation.   
 
 In reality the policy on the general allocation grant/DAU process is indistinct, 
and local understanding is limited. There are issues associated with formulation, 
manipulation, transparency, and the way the process is implemented. There are 
complaints about the DAU formula and criteria used for the computation. Most of the 
problems stem from the lack of understanding and information about the DAU 
allocation on the part of local governments as well as the public. The lack of 
information and the existence of DAU ‘brokers’ and manipulators are signs of lack of 
transparency in the allocation process. These problems are compounded by 
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inconsistent timing. The schedule for settlement of the DAU does not facilitate the 
drafting of the local budget (RAPBD). Presently, local governments have to plan the 
RAPBD without a clear sense of how much they will receive in fund transfers from 
the national government. Planning would improve if, in formulating their RAPBD, 
local governments had sufficient information about their expected revenues, including 
the DAU. This is most important in poorer regions.  
 
 The transfer of fiscal revenue resources from central government remains 
problematic and, to augment their revenue, local governments have resorted to 
increasing taxes and implementing user charges on various services such as public 
market stalls, terminals, and various licenses. Funding is insufficient to support all of 
the responsibilities devolved by the central government. 
  
 In terms of accountability, lack of standard audit procedures remains. This 
reinforces unresponsiveness to demands for greater transparency and accountability. 
The only audit is conducted by the regional supervisory agency, which is a local 
institution. Generally, reporting is only internal. In some regions, the audit reports are 
also submitted to the DPRD, but there is no follow-up by the DPRD.  
 
 DPRDs lack the necessary skills to conduct oversight because of not enough 
capacity. The DPRD monitoring function does not extend equally to all sectors of 
government, it occurs mostly in area that involves large expenditures, such as physical 
infrastructure and investment. Monitoring of public service provision is still 
insufficiently rigorous, and has not extended to the wider impact of policy 
implementation. In many cases, this has resulted in decreased accountability, 
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participation, and public service provision. 
 
 There are indications that efforts to uphold the law are still weak. For example, 
there are reports that DPRD members act in the interest of their political parties or 
factions, as opposed to the interest of the people. This renders the monitoring function 
ineffective. In several regions, the monitoring function is hindered by 
racketeering/extortion/tugs (premanisme) and nepotism. 
 
C.  Monitoring System on the Local Government by the Central Government 
 
Decentralization in Indonesia is implementing in the framework and to strengthen the 
unity of the country. It has unique form of decentralization. Under decentralized 
system, the government has devolved some of duties or authorities to local 
governments with the purpose of quality improvement and better services to the local 
people concerning of local culture and aspirations. Yet the central government is the 
highest authority and still has the power over local governments in some areas. 
 
The decentralization has changed the relationship among the level of 
governments. Before the Law 32/2004—under Law 22/1999, there is no hierarchical 
relationship between province and local government—provincial governments were 
still seeking an appropriate role in the decentralized system. They appeared to be 
unsure of how they fit in the new set-up. Some were playing a coordination role in 
local cooperation. Provincial government plays almost no role in reviewing the local 
regulations. They simply receive copies of the local regulations made by the districts, 
and they are not an integral part of the review procedure. 
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 Then after the Law 32/2004 regulated the provincial governments in 
decentralization era, vertical relations between central and local governments 
(including between the province and the kota/kabupaten) are evolving. These relations 
define the division of labor between the governmental levels, and they are important 
to advancing the aspirations of local governments that are carrying out new functions. 
Given the perceived lack of clarity in the roles of different levels of government, there 
is a debate about whether the present policy environment is sufficient for clarifying 
them. Many believe that no less than national legislation or a presidential decree is 
required. In the interim, both central and local governments rely on the existing “legal 
products.” PP 25/2000 (on Powers of the Government and Powers of the Provinces as 
Autonomous Regions) and PP 20/2001 (on Supervision and Guidance for Regional 
Governance) assigned ministries the role of providing guidance, through the 
provinces, by setting the norms, standards, criteria, and procedures to support the 
implementation of the transferred authority. The formulation of the minimum 
standard and other memoranda contribute to developing a positive relationship—one 
that enhances the abilities of all parties to meet the overall goals of decentralization—
between the kabupaten/kota and the central government (directly or via the provincial 
government). 
 
In order to clarify the monitoring system on local government, the government 
has also enacted Presidential Decree 74/2001 on Supervision Customs on Regional 
Governments Implementation. The monitoring system covers functional, legislative, 
and people supervision.  
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Nonetheless, the division of authority between the central – provincial – 
kabupaten/kota levels of governments is unclear. This has resulted in confusion 
regarding the role of the provinces in a decentralized set up, despite PP 25/2000 and 
Keppres 74/2001. They feel that more guidelines are needed to clarify the roles 
between vertical levels of local government.  
 
Because of that, there is different understanding of the concept of autonomy 
among central government agencies and among local governments. There are 
differences in the ways various ministries interpret the law and the concept of 
autonomy. Similarly, there are differences at the local level, between provinces and 
kabupaten/kota. At both levels, these differences create different expectations. 
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Other major problem came because of slow mind shift towards seeing local 
governments as partners. There are complaints that local governments can now 
disregard central government programs without sanctions or consequence or that they 
do not submit reports (data) when requested. Some central government agencies also 
question the ability of the local governments to perform their assigned functions. As a 
result, some central government agencies are reluctant to work with local 
governments. 
 
In terms of the review process, the Ministry of Home Affairs has the power to 
monitor local regulations making process. However, the main issue is coordination 
between Ministry of Home Affairs and the technical departments in reviewing the 
local regulations. Under the law, local government must submit local regulations to 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, not to the relevant ministry. However, the technical 
departments are very slow in responding to and reviewing local regulations that they 
receive from the Ministry of Home Affairs. 
 
Besides the monitoring system conducted by central government, DPRD has 
great role in monitoring all policy and programs made by local government under 
decentralized system. A new paradigm has started to emerge in the regions at the 
provincial, district and municipal levels. It is apparent that there has been a significant 
change in the attitudes of local assembly members. They have become more 
responsive to the aspirations of the local communities, and have begun to involve 
themselves directly in clarifying and following up individual criticisms and demands 
by their local constituents. In addition, open public debates have begun to flourish. 
The members of the local assemblies have started to use their position and authority to 
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exercise a degree of control over the performance of local senior public servants, as 
well as becoming more critical of local government policies. These changes are 
evidenced by the increasing level and frequency of debates over policy and legislation. 
 
 
 
 
 96
VI.  POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
 
 
Based on experience in Indonesia, we can conclude that decentralization policy is a 
better alternative to closer the government to the people and increase quality and 
quantity of service delivery. However, decentralization in Indonesia is still facing 
many problems because of the relation between central and local government has 
changed several times. 
 
Therefore after evaluating the implementation of decentralization based on 
administrative empowerment, financial empowerment, and monitoring system on the 
local government by the central government aspects, we could give some of 
recommendation in order to improve its performance in the future.  
 
A.  Administrative Empowerment 
 
• The vision when interpreting decentralization policy and autonomy concept has to 
be equal in all government levels. 
• The entire of government layers have to demonstrate their strong commitment to 
support decentralization policy for the sake of people as their stakeholder. 
• Central government agencies must provide supporting regulations to facilitate the 
amendment of local legislation, which is believed inconsistent with the 
decentralization law. 
• To improve administrative empowerment, local governments need standards or 
criteria by which they can assess their performance. These go further than 
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minimum service standards. Local governments need performance indicators to 
objectively assess their performance, not just in service delivery, but in all aspects 
of their functions as well.  
• People should support the performance standards. This will guarantee that public 
feedback is objectively enough and accurately assesses local government 
performance. 
• Local governments should set up their own regulations on these standards as soon 
as possible in the absence of public service standards from the central government. 
Simultaneously, central government needs to start developing national minimum 
public service standards that local governments can use as a point of reference. 
• Local governments have to enhance their understanding and technical capability 
in minimum standard of services to reduce the possibility of error in its use and 
application. 
• One-stop service systems that are successful in some regions need to disseminate 
to other regions.  
• Main concern should be given to formalizing mechanisms for citizen or civil 
society organizations response about local government performance and services, 
and for publicizing information about good practices that can be imitated. 
• Within agriculture sector, central government should formulate a national 
framework for agriculture, in the form of a policy that local governments can 
utilize such as service standards. This framework should explain whether there 
should be land reform or not and to clarifying the overall direction of the central 
government. The framework will give a starting point for local planning and 
budgeting. With such a framework, the central government will also be in a better 
position to advise local governments in making their plans responsive to local 
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needs. 
• In realm of investment, both central and local government must give legal 
certainty and assurance over security for business environment to boost local 
development. The central government should then provide a framework or 
guidelines for carrying out local government’s investment functions. Such 
guidelines would illuminate problems about powers and responsibilities of local 
governments in attracting local and foreign investment, land issues, licensing, and 
guarantees and incentives for prospective investors. 
• Related to the transferred of personnel from central government, local 
governments ought to implement transparent procedures that provide for the 
appointment of career personnel based on competence or meritocracy rather than 
political considerations. They also have to guarantee that training provided to 
personnel is targeted to improving the technical and functional performance of 
each working unit. 
 
B.  Fiscal Empowerment 
 
• Finding innovative ways to generate revenues, beside taxes and user fees are 
desirable. Local governments have to consider the business environment, 
investment, and local economy when creating new taxes and fees. Support from 
central government, such as discover alternative sources of local revenues or 
alternative ways to funding programs and projects, is important in increasing local 
government fiscal capability. 
• The central government has always to inform the local governments about how 
fund transfers are decided and when they are released to evade controversy and 
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speculation. 
• Local governments must link the budget to strategic plans, targets, goals, and 
objectives due to the limited financial resources in most regions. It will allow an 
objective assessment of what is accomplished in various sectors and functions. 
Moreover, it will require greater transparency so that the citizen becomes realistic 
and fair in assessing government performance. 
• Instruments for citizen participation in the budgeting and planning process must 
be set up by local governments. At the same time, civil society organizations must 
develop their skills in budget and planning matters so that they can give 
substantive input when they involve in the process. 
• Local governments must directly involve in the process of formulation, decision, 
and allocation of General Budget Allocation (DAU) and it has to be open and 
appropriate. 
• There should be a mechanism for consultation and public complaints on DAU. 
Thus such mechanism is also needed on other revenue sharing funds (Special 
Allocation Fund—DAK, taxes and natural resources). 
• There should be unambiguous regulations that will direct settled management of 
asset transfer from the central government until the village level. Furthermore, 
there is a need to document assets that have been transferred. This requires 
reconciling the central government’s claims regarding asset transfer with the 
records of what the local governments have actually received. 
 
C.  Monitoring System on Local Government by Central Government  
 
• There should be clarification about the role and relationships between central-
 100
provincial-local levels in order that each level can effectively discharge its 
functions, particularly for the provincial level. Clarity is needed on how the 
province can be an autonomous unit and simultaneously a “representative of the 
central government.” 
• To improve monitoring system besides from central government, developing civil 
society organizations skills in policy advocacy, lobbying, and negotiating with 
local government is desired.  
• The central government ought to create an instrument to guarantee that efforts to 
disseminate minimum public service standard are followed up and continued. 
• The central government should provide support to local governments for 
institutionalized participatory development processes that more concern on 
people-oriented leadership and customer-oriented public service. 
• Active participation of civil society groups and local citizens in all local policy-
making stages—planning, monitoring, and evaluation—need to be guaranteed by 
laws and regulations. It could be national-level guarantees through the local 
Governance Law and its applying regulations, or local level guarantees through 
local regulations. Public involvement is critical to sustain the emergence of 
transparency and accountability.  Participation mechanisms will require changes 
on the part of both civil society and local government. 
• Regarding to the DPRD, it members should reinforce their political commitment 
to represent their constituents. 
• Technical assistance for DPRD members should be designed according to their 
needs and capabilities. Technical assistance such as training would enhance the 
capacity of the DPRD to implement its role as a body of chosen representatives of 
the people. Training in drafting laws and budgeting is urgently needed. 
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• The involvement of local society representatives, the mechanisms or procedures 
which local society should be involved, and the sanctions for local governments 
that do not involve local society in their decisions, should be regulated by 
national-level law or regulation. 
• The regulations on local political parties should be adjusted.  The adjustment 
should guarantee that there are sufficient mechanisms for making political 
institutions (executive, legislative bodies and political parties) carry out the duties 
expected of them in a democracy. 
• To anticipate the flourishing establishment of new regions, central government 
should conduct a comprehensive, independent, and participatory evaluation to 
assess the effectiveness of the establishment of new regions up till now. 
• Consistent with existing decentralization laws, the central government should 
provide a clearer and more complete regulatory framework that will define the 
local government relationships through dialogue with national and local 
governments. 
• The central government has to ensure that local governments make evaluation of 
the current organizational structure is based on an analysis of regional 
requirements. 
• A positive relationship through existing mechanisms should by actively explored 
by central and local governments. It can be done in the course of formulation of 
service standards, and other informal mechanisms like consultation and 
coordination. 
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APPENDIX 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS RELATED TO 
DECENTRALIZATION/REGIONAL AUTONOMY1
 
Constitution 
• The 1945 Constitution of the Republic Indonesia 
• First Amendment to the 1945 Constitution 
• Second Amendment to the 1945 Constitution 
• Third Amendment to the 1945 Constitution 
 
MPR Decrees 
 
Source of Law and the Hierarchy of Legal 
Instruments 
• MPR Decree III/2000 
Policy Recommendation in Implementing 
Regional Autonomy 
• MPR Decree IV/2000 
 
 
Laws 
Amendment to the Law No.22/1999 on Regional 
Administration 
• Law No. 32/2004 
Amendment to the Law No. 25/1999 on the Fiscal 
Balance Between Central and Regional 
Government 
• Law No. 33/2004 
Establishment Bima City in West Nusa Tenggara 
Province 
• Law No. 13/2002 
Establishment Pariaman City in West Nusa 
Sumatera Province 
• Law No. 12/2002 
Establishment Mamasa Regency and Palopo City 
in South Nusa Sulawesi Province 
• Law No. 11/2002 
Establishment Parigi Moutong Regency in 
Central Sulawesi Province 
• Law No. 10/2002 
Establishment Rote-Ndao Regency in East Nusa 
Tenggara Province 
• Law No. 9/2002 
Establishment Talaud Archipelago Regency in 
North Sulawesi Province 
• Law No. 8/2002 
Establishment Penajam Paser Regency in East 
Kalimantan Province 
• Law No. 7/2002 
Establishment Banyuasin Regency in South 
Sumatera Province 
• Law No. 6/2002 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Source: GOI and http://www.gtzfdm.or.id 
 1
Establishment Katingan Regency, Seruyan 
Regency, Sukamara Regency, Lamandau 
Regency, Gunung Mas Regency, Pulang Pisau 
Regency, Murung Raya Regency and East Barito 
in Central Kalimantan Province 
• Law No. 5/2002 
Establishment South West Aceh Regency, Nagan 
Raya Regency and Aceh Tamiang Regency in 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province 
• Law No. 4/2002 
On Special Autonomy for the Papua Province • Law No. 21/2001 
Special Autonomy for Daerah Istimewa Aceh as 
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province 
• Law No. 18/2001 
Amendment to the Law No. 55/1999 on Landak 
Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 15/2000 
Amendment of Law No. 54/1999 on Sarolangun 
Regency, Tebo Regency, Muaro Jambi Regency 
and Tanjung Jabung Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 14/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 53/1999 on 
Palalawan Regency, Rokan Hulu Regency, Rokan 
Hilir Regency, Siak Regency, Karimun Regency, 
Natuna Regency, Kuantan Singingi Regency, and 
Batam City Establishment 
• Law No. 13/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 52/1999 on Lambata 
Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 12/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 51/1999 on Buol 
Regency, Morowali Regency and Banggai 
Archipelago Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 11/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 50/1999 on Boalemo 
Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 10/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 49/1999 on 
Mentawai Archipelago Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 9/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 48/1999 on Bireuen 
Regency and Simeulue Regency Establishment 
• Law No. 8/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 47/1999 on Nunukan 
Regency, Malinau Regency, West Kutai 
Regency, East Kutai Regency and Bontang City 
Establishment 
• Law No. 7/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 46/1999 on North 
Maluku Regency, Buru Regency and West 
Maluku Tenggara Establishment 
• Law No. 6/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 45/1999 on Central 
Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, 
Paniai Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya 
Regency and Sorong City Establishment 
• Law No. 5/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 18/1997on Regional 
Taxes and Regional Levies 
• Law No. 34/2000 
Amendment to the Law No. 8/1974 on the 
Ordinance of the Civil Service 
• Law No. 43/1999 
Forestry Law • Law No. 41/1999 
Government of the Capital City of Republic 
Indonesia, Jakarta Province 
• Law No. 34/1999 
Combating Corruption as a Criminal Act • Law No. 31/1999 
Implementing Good Governance and Free of 
Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism 
• Law No. 28/1999 
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Government Regulations 
Amendment to the Government Regulation No. 
104/2001 on Balance Fund 
• Government Regulation No. 84/2001
General Guidelines for Organizing Rural • Government Regulation No. 76/2001
Airport • Government Regulation No. 70/2001
Harbor • Government Regulation No. 69/2001
Regional Taxes • Government Regulation No. 65/2001
Regional Levies • Government Regulation No. 66/2001
Reporting on Regional Administration • Government Regulation No. 56/2001
Implementation the Supporting Duty • Government Regulation No. 52/2001
Organizing Deconcentration • Government Regulation No. 39/2001
• Government Regulation No. 20/2001 On Fostering and Supervision of Local 
Governance 
• Government Regulation No. 11/2001 Concerning Information on Regional Finances 
Concerning Protection and Transfer of the State 
Owned Goods/Properties from Central 
Government to Regional Government in the 
Process of Regional Autonomy Implementation 
• Government Regulation No. 2/2001 
Concerning the Guidelines on Compiling 
Regional House of Representative Regulations 
• Government Regulation No. 1/2001 
Concerning Election Procedure, Legalization and 
Dismissal of Regional Head and Sub-Head 
• Government Regulation No. 
151/2000 
Concerning Formation Rules and Regulations and 
Development Criteria, Elimination and Regional 
Merging 
• Government Regulation No. 
129/2000 
Concerning Distribution of Citizens Income Tax 
Outcome Acceptance and Income Tax on Article 
21 Between Central Government and Regional 
Government 
• Government Regulation No. 
115/2000 
• Government Regulation No. 
114/2000 
Concerning Cancellation of Government’s 
Regulation No. 33/1997 on Distribution of 
Revenue on Land and Building Rights Between 
Central and Regional Governments 
Concerning Financial Status of the Regional 
House of Representative 
• Government Regulation No. 
110/2000 
Concerning Financial Status of the Regional 
Head and Sub-Head 
• Government Regulation No. 
109/2000 
• Government Regulation No. 
108/2000 
Concerning Procedure Accountability of the 
Regional Head 
• Government Regulation No. 
107/2000 
Concerning Regional Government Borrowing 
• Government Regulation No. 
106/2000 
Concerning Financial Management and 
Accountability in Implementation of 
Deconcentration and Supporting Duty 
• Government Regulation No. 
105/2000 
Concerning Region’s Financial Management and 
Accountability 
Concerning Equilibrium Funds • Government Regulation No. 
104/2000 
Concerning Education and Training for State 
Civil Employee 
• Government Regulation No. 
101/2000 
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Concerning State Civil Employee’s Appointment 
in a Structural Position 
• Government Regulation No. 
100/2000 
Concerning Promotion of Civil Servants • Government Regulation No. 99/2000
Concerning Provision of Civil Servants • Government Regulation No. 98/2000
Concerning Formation of Civil Servants • Government Regulation No. 97/2000
Concerning Civil Servant’s Authorization of 
Promotion, Relocation and Dismissal 
• Government Regulation No. 96/2000
Concerning Regional Apparatus Organization 
Guideline 
• Government Regulation No. 84/2000
Concerning Relocation of West Lombok Regency 
City 
• Government Regulation No. 62/2000
Concerning Government Authority and The 
Provincial Authority as an Autonomous Region 
• Government Regulation No. 25/2000
Concerning Implementation Procedure of 
Public’s Role in the State’s Implementation 
• Government Regulation No. 68/1999
 
 
Presidential Decrees 
Concerning Institutional Guidelines and Regional 
Hospitals Administration 
• Presidential Decree No. 40/2001 
Concerning Regional Autonomy Implementation 
on Land Affairs 
• Presidential Decree No. 10/2001 
Concerning Supervision Customs on Regional 
Governments Implementation 
• Presidential Decree No. 74/2001 
Concerning Utilizing of Contingency Fund for 
Assistances in Personnel Transfer, Equipments, 
Payments and Documents (P3D) to Regional 
Government 
• Presidential Decree No. 39/2001 
Concerning Determination of Numbers and 
Procedures in Filling up Membership of Regional 
House Representative in New Provinces and 
Regencies/Cities after the Election year 1999 
• Presidential Decree No. 6/2001 
Concerning the Implementation of Regency/City 
Authorities 
• Presidential Decree No. 5/2001 
Concerning Guidelines for Formation of Regional 
Civil Service Bureaus 
• Presidential Decree No. 159/2000 
Concerning Amendment to Presidential Decree 
No. 49/2000 on Regional Autonomy Advisory 
Council as already amended by Presidential 
Decree No. 84/2000 
• Presidential Decree No. 151/2000 
Concerning Regional Autonomy Advisory 
Council 
• Presidential Decree No. 49/2000 
• Presidential Decree No. 18/2000 Concerning Guidelines for The Implementation 
of The Procurement of Goods/Services for 
Government Agencies 
• Presidential Decree No. 17/2000 Concerning the Implementation of the State 
Revenues and Expenditures Budget 
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Other Regulations and Guidelines 
 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 141/KMK.07/2001 
Regional Financial Information System 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 154/KMK.07/2001 
Formation and Procedures of Regional Finance 
Information Submission 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 346/KMK.07/2001 
 
Establishment of Draft Law Formation Team on 
Law Amendment No. 25/1999 About Central and 
Local Fiscal Balance 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 343/KMK.06/2001 
 
Fixation of Regional Total Allocation From Oil 
and Natural Gas Resources, General Mining and 
Fisheries for 2001 
Regional Fund Distribution From Natural 
Resources 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 344/KMK.06/2001 
 
Agreement on How to Use Partial Fund of Non-
Taxable State Income from Provincial Forest 
Resources in the Department of Forestry 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 368/KMK.06/2001 
 
 
Amendment of the Minister’s Decree No. 
343/KMK.06/2001 re. Fixation of Regional Total 
Allocation From Oil and Natural Gas Resources, 
General Mining and Fisheries for 2001 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 575/KMK.06/2001 
 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 491/KMK.02/2001 
Special Allocation Fund (DAK) State Budget 
Reforestation Fund of 2001 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 564/KMK.02/2001 
Issuance of Authorization Decree Letter (SKO) as 
a Foundation of Fund Legalization of Regional 
Production Sharing From Land and Building 
Taxation Revenues  
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 655/KMK.02/2001 
Amendment to the Minister’s Decree No. 
556/KMK.07/2001 re. Procedures of DAU and 
DAK Allocation 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 625/KMK.01/2001 
Amendment to the Minister’s Decree No. 
99/KMK.07/2001 re. Postponement of Regional 
Borrowing Implementation  
• Decree of The State Civil Service 
Agency No. 9/2001 
Implementation of Government Regulation No. 
97/2000 re. Formulation of Civil Servants 
Regional Policy Repressive Control • Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 41/2001 
• Decree of The National Civil Service 
Agency No. 43/KEP/2001 
Standard of Structural Competencies of State 
Civil Servants 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
23/2001 
Forms of Regional Law Formation 
 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
22/2001 
Form of Regional Law Products 
 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
17/2001 
Functional Control Authorization From Regions 
to the Governor 
• Decree of The Minister of Finance 
No. 344/KMK.06/2001 
Concerning the Distribution of Funds Being 
Portion of Region from Natural Resources 
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Concerning Guidelines of Minimum Standard of 
Service (PSPM) in the Trading and Industrial 
Field  
• Decree of The Minister of Industry 
and Trade No. 78/MPP/Kep/3/2001 
Government Administration Area Data • Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
13/2001 
 
• Circular Letter of The Minister of 
Home Affairs No. 061/729/TJ dated 
March 21, 2001  
Regional Apparatus Formation 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 80/MPP/Kep/3/2001 
Remittance of State Ownerships within the 
Department of Industry and Trade to be 
Transferred of Regional Government 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
8/2001 
Guidance on Civil Servants Who are Chosen to 
be The Village Head or Appointed to be Village 
Apparatus 
• Circular Letter No. 
118/1500/PUMDA  
Rearrangement of Authority and Institutions 
Working Plan on how to Accelerate the 
Implementation of Laws No. 22 and 25 of 1999 
• Circular Letter No. 
118/1379/PUMDA  
Guidance on Forming Regional Government 
Association and Fixing Regional Government 
Representative Association as Members of 
Regional Autonomy Advisory Board 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
16/2000 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
118-281/2000 
Forming Regional Autonomy Advisory Board 
Secretariat 
 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 556/KMK.03/2000 
Procedures of DAU and DAK Distribution 
 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 523/KMK.03/2000 
Procedures of Budgeting, Funds Distribution, 
Responsibility and Reporting of Deconcentration 
Implementation and Assistance 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
50/2000 
Guidance on Organization Formulation and 
Regional Regency/City 
Apparatus Working Procedures 
Guidance on Letter Writing Procedures within 
Regency/City Governments 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
48/2000 
Guidance on Letter Writing Procedures within 
Provincial Government 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs and Regional Autonomy No. 
47/2000 
General Guidance on How to Arrange a Mutual 
Assistance Association in the Kampung 
• Decree of The Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 65/99 
General Guidance on How to Arrange Village • Decree of Minister of Home Affairs 
No. 64/99  
Implementation Guidance and Adjustment of 
Terminology in Organizing Kampung and Village 
Government 
• Decree of Minister of Home Affairs 
No. 63/99 
Extraction of Several Regulations, Decrees and 
Instructions Concerning the Implementation of 
Law No. 5/1979 re. Village Government 
• The Regulation of Minister of Home 
Affairs No. 4/99 
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